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COMPETITION OR CONTROL I: THE
CHAOS IN THE CASES*
G. E. Hale t and Rosemary D. Hale t
APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PUBLIC UTILITIES:
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
At common law and under both state and federal statutes monop-
olization and restraint of trade are forbidden. The leading federal
statute, the Sherman Act,' has assumed virtually constitutional stature.
Some state legislation I is patterned closely after the federal statutes;
other states have no statutes and still others have enacted measures of
a different character. It is worth noting that the antitrust statutes
of several states are specifically directed at various industries now
subject to regulation. Thus there are enactments addressed to tele-
graph companies, gas companies, telephone companies, railroad com-
panies, street railroads and the like.3 In general, both state and federal
legislation seek to enforce a policy of competition. Monopolies and
monopolistic acts are anathemas.
For centuries, however, the common law has recognized certain
"callings" as "affected with a public interest." Persons engaged in
those "callings" are under a duty to serve all who apply for their
products at reasonable prices. In return they may afford certain
protection from the rigors of competition.4 Thus, Lord Blackstone
noted that:
* This Article is the first of a series by the authors dealing with the application
of antitrust laws to regulated industries. The present Article sets forth the decisions
and points out the conflicts which exist. Subsequent articles will analyse the possible
reasons for the differences in approach found in the cases with a view to presenting
a coherent picture of the present state of the law. An attempt will then be made to
suggest rational standards for the future.
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1. 26 SArAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (Supp. IV, 1957).
2. WPA, STAT4 AxTT-TRusT LAWS (Martin ed. 1940).
3. Id. at Lv.
4. In dissenting from a substantive due process decision, the late Mr. Justice Bran-
deis said: "The cases just cited show that, while, ordinarily free competition in the
common callings has been encouraged, the public welfare may at other times demand
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"If a ferry is erected on a river, so near another ancient ferry
as to draw away its custom, it is a nuisance to the owner of the
old one. For where there is a ferry by prescription, the owner
is bound to keep it always in repair and readiness for the ease of
all the king's subjects; otherwise he may be greviously amerced;
it would be therefore extremely hard if a new ferry were suffered
to share his profits, which does not also share his burthen." 6
And both the federal and state governments have intervened legislatively
in a wide variety of industries with the result that for many, govern-
ment fixes prices, licenses entry and controls the services rendered. In
these sectors of the economy regulation and not competition is the order
of the day.'
It has often been urged that the enactment of interventionist
legislation of the type just described supersedes the antitrust laws.
Writers ' and courts 8 have stressed that regulation is to serve in lieu
of competition and is to protect the business as well as the public.
Regulation and competition are supposedly to be viewed as mutually
exclusive regimes, the introduction of one to be followed by the
disappearance of the other. Nevertheless, many courts have insisted
on applying the antitrust laws to regulated industries unless barred by
a statutory exemption for the type of conduct under judicial scrutiny.
In reply, legislatures have sometimes seen fit to spell out specific
exemptions. And in other instances courts themselves, particularly
when dealing with politically powerful groups, have found such exemp-
tions to exist by implication.'
In the pages which follow, we set forth decisions involving the
application of antitrust principles to a broad range of industries com-
monly regarded as regulated. We are not concerned with the validity
that monopolies be created. Upon this principle is based our whole modern practice of
public utility regulation. It is no objection to the validity of the statute here assailed
that it fosters monopoly. That, indeed, is its design. The certificate of public convenience
and invention [sic] is a device-a recent social-economic invention-through which the
monopoly is kept under effective control by vesting in a commission the power to
terminate it whenever that course is required in the public interest." New State Ice
Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 304 (1932).
5. 3 BLAcKSTONX, COMMENTARIS *219.
6. See Hardman, The Changing Law of Competition in. Public Service, 33 W. Va.
L.Q. 219, 221 (1927). Cf. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), in which it was
held that the antitrust laws did not extend to activities of the states.
7. 3 POND, PUBLIC UrILIrTIES § 901 (4th ed. 1932).
8. See Choate v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 309 Ill. 248, 256, 141 N.E. 12, 15-16
(1923).
9. See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 229-33 (1941); United States
v. Maryland Cooperative Milk Producers, 145 F. Supp. 151, 154 (D.D.C. 1956); cf.
Fosburgh v. California & Hawaiian Sugar Co., 291 Fed. 29 (9th Cir. 1923) ; Hadley,
Public Utilities and the Anti-Trust Law, 10 B.U.L. Rzv. 351, 359-62 (1930).
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of that regulation.' Nor are we here concerned with the division of
power between the nation and the states or between the state and its
subdivisions; we take no account of decisions dealing with the scope
of corporate franchises or with the validity of exclusive rights granted
to corp6rations engaging in "public callings." " Our focus is upon
the substantive application of the antitrust statutes and hence we do
not consider their purely adjective aspects, such as the remedies avail-
able thereunder, nor do we go far into the interesting and important
question of primary jurisdiction.'
We turn, then, to a survey of the several industries affected by
state, federal and local regulation. As to each we have assembled
cases illustrating application of antitrust statutes and principles thereto.
While the categories in which the industries are grouped necessarily
somewhat overlap, it is believed that problems of industry definition
need not concern us in the present study.
RAILROADS
Governmental control over railroading, instituted many decades
ago, is today the prototype of modern public utility regulation. In
addition to federal intervention through the Interstate Commerce Act,'3
most states have also enacted legislation subjecting the railroads to
detailed supervision.' 4 Commissions commonly control entry, rates,
service, abandonment of lines or branches,' 5 and even methods of
10. Thus we need take no account of the long line of decisions holding that inter-
ventionist statutes denied substantive due process of law. In any event those decisions,
dealing with the constitutionality of state and federal legislation fixing prices and the
like, merely held that the due process clauses of the constitutions did or did not
guarantee such economic freedom.
11. Hadley, supra note 9, at 353-55.
12. "Primary jurisdiction" is the adjective side of the conflict between competition
and intervention. It is somewhat akin to the doctrine that one must exhaust his ad-
ministrative remedies before seeking judicial relief. It requires, in brief, that a litigant
resort to the administrative tribunal created by interventionist legislation before seeking
to enforce the antitrust laws in court. Its origins lay in rate reparation cases wherein
relief was held to be available before the Interstate Commerce Commission and not
in the courts. Later it spread into other areas of regulation and now finds wide-
spread application. Jaffe, Primary Juwisdictim Reconsidered: The Anti-Trust Laws,
102 U. PA. L. Rev. 577, 581-83 (1954). Compare Schwartz, Legal Restrictionms on
Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67
HARv. L. Rtv. 436 (1954), suith von Mehren, The Anti-Trust Laws and Regulated
Industries: The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, 67 HAv. L. R. 929 (1954).
Perhaps it is also well to note that citation of cases herein is illustrative, rather than
exhaustive.
13. 24 STAT. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-10 (Supp. IV, 1957). It has
been the subject of frequent amendment chronicled at length in 1 SHARPMAN, THX
INTERSTATt CO. IMeRCn CoMMasISSI N (1934). Later developments are summarized
in Harbeson, The Transportation Act of 1940, 17 J. LAND & P.U. EcoN. 291 (1941).
14. See ILL. ANx. STAT. c. 111 2/3, §§ 1-10.5 (Smith-Hurd 1954).
15. 24 STAT. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1 (18) (1952).
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financing. 6  Discrimination among shippers is prohibited 17 and the
federal statute contains a well-known clause forbidding the charging of
a higher rate for a short haul than a long haul over the same route
in the same direction.18  The Interstate Commerce Commission may
approve pooling of earnings, division of traffic and mergers and con-
solidations of railroads.' 9
Even apart from statutory exemptions, it was early asserted that
the extensive controls over railroads vested in regulatory agencies
made inapposite application of the antitrust laws. The argument was
first raised only seven years after passage of the Sherman Act in
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'u2s which involved an
agreement on rates. The Court, in rejecting this argument,2 found
that the Interstate Commerce Act had not been repealed by implication
but that the railroads were nevertheless subject to the Sherman Act.
To the contention that if the Congress had intended to apply the
Sherman Act to railroads it would have amended the Interstate
Commerce Act directly, the Court replied that the Commerce Act did
not authorize the kind of agreement before the Court 22 nor did it
make any pretense of being an inclusive "set of rules and regulations
. to govern . . . in all cases." ' It could find no reason why
the kind of conduct proscribed by the Sherman Act would be any the
less evil when indulged in by railroads than when indulged in by
industrial corporations.2 4
Mr. Justice White joined with three of his colleagues in dissenting.
He wrote that in the Sherman Act Congress did not intend to interfere
with the control and regulation established by the Interstate Commerce
Act nor to promote a constant fluctuation of the regulated rates through
competition. To the contrary, he found that agreements among com-
peting as well as connecting carriers seeking to prevent the under-
cutting of rates had existed prior to the enactment of the Interstate
Commerce Act and were not only not forbidden by that legislation
but were to be deemed instruments tending to secure its successful
evolution.
16. 24 STAT. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1 (14) (1952).
17. 24 STAT. 380 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 5 (11) (1952).
18. 24 STAT. 380 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 4 (1952).
19. 24 STAT. 380 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 5 (1952).
20. 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
21. Id. at 314-17.
22. Id. at 314-15.
23. Id. at 316.
24. Id. at 322-23, 325.
25. Id. at 364.
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I In view of the split in the Court, the railroads continued to press
the argument2 6 Although the Sherman Act was applied to railroads
in a long series of decisions," the Supreme Court was told again in
1945 in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R.28 that regulation must imply ex-
emption. Once more the Court, divided five to four, held that the anti-
trust laws could be applied to certain kinds of railroad conduct:
"These carriers are subject to the antitrust laws.
Conspiracies among carriers to fix rates were included in the
broad sweep of the Sherman Act. . . . Congress has not given
the Commission . . . authority to remove rate-fixing combina-
tions from the prohibitions contained in the antitrust laws. It
has not placed these combinations under the control and super-
vision of the Commission. Nor has it empowered the Commission
to proceed against such combinations and through cease and
desist orders or otherwise to put an end to their activities. Regu-
lated industries are not per se exempt from the Sherman Act.
" 29
Mr. Chief Justice Stone, joined by Justices Roberts, Frankfurter and
Jackson, dissented. He urged that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust
its administrative remedies under the Interstate Commerce Act; that
the Interstate Commerce Commission had exclusive jurisdiction to
determine the lawfulness of all rates appearing in filed tariffs and
authority to suspend rates; and that the Commission had been directed
to act in such a way as to foster the national transportation policy and
to consider a multitude of factors.3" He went on to point out that if
one plaintiff were allowed relief under the antitrust laws the effect
would be to prevent that uniform application of rates and service
envisaged by the Interstate Commerce Act and to create discrimination
against others.31
Although the law seems settled that railroads are not per se
exempt from the antitrust laws, the courts have still not been willing
to make available a complete arsenal of antitrust remedies against them.
26. See United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 529 (1898) ; Northern
Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 343 (1904). In the latter case Mr.
Justice White again dissented. Id. at 376.
27. Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 297 U.S. 500, 515-16 (1936);
United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 226 U.S. 61 (1912); United States v. Terminal
R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912), contempt proceedings reported, 266 U.S. 17 (1924) ;
United States v. Southern Pac. R.., 259 U.S. 214 (1922), subsequent proceedings
reported, 290 Fed. 443 (D. Utah 1923) ; Meeker v. Lehigh Valley K-R., 183 Fed. 548,
550-51 (2d Cir. 1910); United States v. Association of Am. R.R., 4 F.R.D. 510, 522,
524 (D. Neb. 1945); Tift v. Southern Ry., 138 Fed. 753 (C.C.W.D. Ga. 1905), aff'd,
148 Fed. 1021 (5th Cir. 1906), aff'd, 206 U.S. 428 (1907); United States v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 142 Fed. 176, 184 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1905).
28. 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
29. Id. at 456.
30. Id. at 476-78.
31. Id. at 488.
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The question first arose in Keogh v. Chicago & N.W.R.R.32 Com-
peting carriers were alleged to have fixed rates by agreement. The
rates were then filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, and
the Commission approved them after a hearing. A shipper filed an
action under the Sherman Act seeking to recover treble damages, alleg-
ing that the rates had been fixed by agreement, whereby he had been
injured. The Court denied relief, holding that the injured shipper
could not recover treble damages because Congress had intended him
to recover only reparations under the provisions of the Interstate
Commerce Act. The Court pointed out that if treble damages were
allowed, the remedy would constitute a discrimination against other
patrons of the railroad. In dictum, however, it added that approval of
the rates by the Interstate Commerce Commission would not bar an
action by the Attorney General. A few years later in Central Transfer
Co. v. Terminal Ry. Ass'n,m a private party brought suit to enjoin
acts of railroad carriers allegedly in violation of the antitrust laws but
also within the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Again relief was denied; the Court declared that under the statute
only the Attorney General could secure injunctive relief, pointing out
that injunctive relief in favor of a private party would disrupt the
Commission's regulatory patternf
4
There has been greater division of opinion in the state courts but
the weight of authority appears to support the federal view that anti-
trust statutes may be applied to railroads. In a leading decision 8 5
32. 260 U.S. 156 (1922). Cf. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204
U.S. 426 (1907).
33. 288 U.S. 469 (1933).
34. Cf. Seatrain Lines v. Pennsylvania R.R., 207 F.2d 255, 260, 262 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 916 (1953); Wheeling & L.E. Ry. v. Pittsburgh Ry., 33 F.
2d 390, 393 (6th Cir. 1929). See also McLean Trucdng Co. v. United States, 321 U.S.
67, 83 (1944). Instructive, too, is the subsequent history of several of the cases in which
the antitrust laws have been held applicable to railroads. In United States v. Terminal
Ry. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912), contempt proceedings were attempted by way of en-
forcement. 266 U.S. 17 (1924). The Court, however, held that the parties sought to
be benefited by the prior judgment must proceed before the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, implying that the courts could not give effective relief without endangering
the regulatory pattern. In United States v. Southern Pac. Co., 259 U.S. 214 (1922), the
Court held that the Southern Pacific Company must divest itself of the Central Pacific
Lines. Thereafter the Southern Pacific applied to the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission and received permission to acquire the Central Pacific by means of a lease.
It was held that then the decree in the antitrust case must recognize the validity of
the acquisition approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission. 290 Fed. 443 (D.
Utah 1923).
35. State v. Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry., 99 Tex. 516, 91 S.W. 214 (1906). Accord,
Pearsall v. Great No. Ry., 161 U.S. 646 (1896); Central R.R. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582,
640 (1869); Evansville So. & No. Ry. v. Evansville & E. Elec. Ry., 50 Ind. App. 502,
98 N.E. 649 (1912) ; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. v. Southern I. Ry., 38 Ind. App. 234, 70 N.E.
843 (1904) ; Eel River R.Rt v. State, 155 Ind. 433, 455, 57 N.E. 388, 395, 396 (1900);
Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Southern Pac. Ry., 41 La. Ann. 970, 980, 6 So. 888, 891 (1889);
Bennett v. Southern Ry., 211 N.C. 474, 483-86, 191 S.E. 240, 246, 248 (1937) ; Trans-
portation Co. v. Ohio River Pipe Line Co., 22 W. Va. 600, 625 (1883).
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the Texas Supreme Court rejected the contention that a state law
creating a railroad commission and investing it with power to regulate
rates charged by railroad and express companies exempted combinations
between them from the state antitrust laws. Other cases reach similar
results by applying the common-law restraint of trade doctrine and in
still others account is taken of specific constitutional or statutory di-
rectives to apply antitrust principles to railroadsY8
A case looking in the opposite direction is Yazoo & Miss. Valley
Ry. v. Searles.17  An association of railroads organized a boycott of
the plaintiff in order to enforce rules with respect to payment for de-
murrage. As a result plaintiff's competitors received sidetrack service
which he was denied. Suit was brought under a state antitrust statute
and the defendants answered that the demurrage rules had been issued
by the state railroad commission. The court accepted this as a defense,
holding that concerted action to enforce the car service rules of the
state railroad commission was not within the antitrust laws. It stressed
the desirability of uniform charges for demurrage and pointed out that
if the plaintiff were not required to pay such charges he would obtain
an advantage over his rivals.88
To complete the railroad picture, note should be taken of the
specific exemption from the federal antitrust laws afforded certain
transactions by the Reed-Bulwinkle Act, an amendment to the Inter-
state Commerce Act. The railroads are authorized to enter into
agreements with respect to rates, divisions, charges for equipment and
the like and to submit the same to the Interstate Commerce Commission
for approval. There follow several limitations, including clauses mak-
36. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. 11, § 11; Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Franzen, 287
Ill. 346, 122 N.E. 492 (1919) ; Illinois State Trust Co. v. St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry., 208
Ill. 419, 70 N.E. 347 (1904) ; American Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota & N. W. R.R.,
157 II. 641, 650-51, 42 N.E. 153, 156 (1895) ; Louisville & N. Ry. v. Commonwealth, 97
Ky. 675, 31 S.W. 476 (1895), aff'd, 161 U.S. 677, 698 (1896) ; Pennsylvania R.R. v.
Commonwealth, 7 Atl. 368 (Pa. 1886) ; Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. v. State, 72 Tex. 404, 10
S.W. 81 (1888); WPA, STATE ANTI-TRUST LAWS LII (Martin ed. 1940). In several
additional decisions the courts have indicated that they thought antitrust statutes were
applicable to railroads but did not specifically so hold. Lisman v. Knickerbocker Trust
Co., 211 Fed. 413, 421 (6th Cir. 1914) ; Cleveland C. C. & I. Ry. v. Closser, 126 Ind.
348, 26 N.E. 159 (1890) ; Venner v. New York Cent. & H. R.R., 177 App. Div. 296,
305-07, 164 N.Y. Supp. 626, 632-33 (2d Dep't 1917), affd per curiam, 226 N.Y. 583,
123 N.E. 893, cert. denied, 249 U.S. 617 (1919) ; Paterson v. Southern Ry., 214 N.C.
38, 198 S.E. 364 (1938); Carolina Motor Serv. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 210 N.C.
36-39, 185 S.E. 479, 481 (1936); Cumberland V.R.R. v. Gettsyburg & H. Ry., 177 Pa.
519, 35 Atl. 952 (1896); State ex rel. Cascade R.R. v. Superior Court, 51 Wash. 346,
98 Pac. 739 (1909).
37. 85 Miss. 520, 37 So. 939 (1905).
38. Id. at 545-46, 37 So. at 948. See State ex rel. Thompson v. National Ry. &
Light, 151 Tenn. 77, 90-92, 268 S.W. 120, 124 (1925). Among other decisions looking
in the same general direction are Manchester L. R.R. v. Concord Ry., 66 N.H. 100.
20 Atl. 383 (1890); Ives v. Smith, 3 N.Y. Supp. 645, 654 (Sup. Ct. 1888), aff'd
per curiain, 55 Hun. 606 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1889). See also MoRAW-rz, PRIVATE CopoRA-
TIONS § 1131 (2d ed. 1886) ; H.R. REP1. No. 1100, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1947).
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ing it clear that there should be continued competition in rates between
railroads and other carriers and that the Commission must find that
each party to the agreement retains the free and unrestrained right to
take independent action. Finally, if the agreement is approved by the
Commission, the parties are relieved from the operation of the antitrust
laws, subject to any terms and conditions prescribed by the Com-
mission. 9 The Commission similarly has power to approve mergers.
It has commented that the standard it uses to determine whether a
proposed merger should be approved is different from that used by the
Justice Department and other federal agencies in enforcing the anti-
trust laws. "This is necessarily so because a completely regulated
industry is involved, which regulation in itself protects the public
interest." 40
GAs
Manufacture and distribution of gas by means of fixed facilities
for domestic, commercial and industrial purposes have long been the
subject of regulation." Under state legislation administrative agencies
possess sweeping controls over operation of gas companies. They are
usually empowered to license entry into the field, fix rates, establish
service standards, prescribe uniform systems of accounting, fix methods
of depreciation, control the issuance of securities and permit mergers
and consolidations.' The role of the federal government has been
relatively recent and somewhat limited.' The federal statute is
primarily aimed at the interstate transmission of the natural product
and gives the Federal Power Commission authority to fix rates, to
prohibit discrimination, to license firms entering the field, to compel ex-
tension of service and the like.44 It is worth noting that the Natural
Gas Act contains the following provisions:
39. 36 STAT. 548 (1906), 49 U.S.C. § 5b (9) (1952). It will, of course, be observed
that the Reed-Bulwinkle amendment does not exempt the carriers from many other pro-
visions of the federal antitrust laws.
40. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Study of Corporate Mergers by the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 474 (1956). See 24 STAT.
384 (1887), 49 U.S.C. § 15 (1952).
41. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 111 2/3, § 10.3 (Smith-Hurd 1954). See also IL.
ANN. STAT. c. 32, §§ 399-410 (Smith-Hurd 1954), permitting consolidation of gas
companies.
42. BARES, Txi EcoNomIcs op PUBLIC UTILnY REGULATION 212-13 (1942);
TROXEL, EcoNoMics OF PUBLIC UTILITIEs 76-77, 466 (1947).
43. Natural Gas Act, 52 STAT. 821-33 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7 17-17w
(1948), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717 (Supp. IV, 1957).
44. 52 STAT. 822 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717c (1952). Recently controversy has arisen
with respect to the scope of the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission to fix
the producers' price of natural gas. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S.
672 (1953).
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"Nothing contained in this section shall be construed as a
limitation upon the power of the Commission to grant certificates
of public convenience and necessity for service of an area already
being served by another natural-gas company.45 . . . . The
Commission may transmit such evidence as may be available con-
cerning such acts or practices or concerning apparent violations of
the federal antitrust laws to the Attorney General who, in his dis-
cretion, may institute the necessary criminal proceedings." 4"
A more even division of opinion has been recorded with respect
to the application of antitrust principles to gas companies than in the
case of railroads. Many of the early cases, relying on the common
law and the duties of the gas companies under their charters and
franchises, insist on competition and prohibit contracts for divisions
of territory. Thus in Chicago Gas Light & Coke Co. v. People's Gas
Light & Coke Co.,47 two companies authorized to lay mains in the city
of Chicago had made an agreement dividing territory and selling each
other property in the other's territory. Later one of them disregarded
the agreement and began to compete. A bill for specific performance
of the contract was denied, the court declaring that the contract for
division of territory was unenforceable in equity because each com-
pany owed a public duty to serve the entire area.4" The contract was
also denounced as tending to create a monopoly.49
Two important decisions indicate that certain gas company activ-
ities should not be subject to antitrust statutes or the common-law rules
against restraints of trade. Weld v. Gas & Elec. Light Comm'rs r0
involved a commission-approved agreement by two public utility
companies to divide territory. The court held that a consumer could
not complain of a division of territory on the ground that in this area
the state had adopted a policy of regulation as a reliance against the
45. 56 STAT. 83 (1942), 15 U.S.C. § 717f (g) (1952).
46. 52 STrAT. 832 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717s (b) (1952).
47. 121 Ill. 530, 13 N.E. 169 (1887).
48. Id. at 540, 542, 13 N.E. 172, 173. Accord, Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co., 130
U.S. 396 (1889); People ex rel. Peabody v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130 I1. 268, 22
N.E. 798 (1889) ; State ex rel. Snyder v. Portland Natural Gas Co., 153 Ind. 483,
485, 53 N.E. 1089, 1091 (1899). See also McKinney v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 206
Fed. 772, 777 (D. Kan. 1913); People ex rel. Fitzhenry v. Union Gas Co., 254 Ill.
395, 98 N.E. 768 (1912); City of Vincennes v. Citizens' Gaslight Co., 132 Ind. 114,
118, 31 N.E. 573, 576 (1892) ; Citizens' Natural Gas Co. v. Town of Elwood, 114 Ind.
332, 334, 16 N.E. 624, 626 (1888); Gathright v. Byllesby & Co., 154 Ky. 106, 157
S.W. 45 (1913) ; City of Okmnulgee v. Okmulgee Gas Co., 140 Okla. 88, 98-100, 282
Pac. 640, 649-51 (1929) ; Charleston Natural Gas Co. v. Kanawha Gas Co., 58 W. Va.
22, 50 S.E. 876 (1905); Parkersburg Gas Co. v. Parkersburg, 30 W. Va. 435, 4 S.E.
650 (1887); Lake, Competition in the Public Utility Fields, 10 Miss. L.J. 197, 199
(1938).
49. Chicago Gas Light & Coke Co. v. People's Gas Light & Coke Co., 121 Ill. 530,
544, 13 N.E. 169, 174 (1887).
50. 197 Mass. 556, 84 N.E. 101 (1908).
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evil effect of monopoly to the exclusion of competition.5' In Attorney
Gen. v. Consolidated Gas Co.,' 2 the court held lawful a combination
of competing gas companies. In sweeping language it declared it to
be "the settled policy of the state to discourage competition" between
two or more gas companiesP Weld and Consolidated cannot be
reconciled with Chicago Gas, Light & Coke Co. A conflict of cases
in this industry is clear.
WATER
Water companies are, of course, commonly regulated." Relatively
few cases have dealt with the gathering and supplying of water through
permanent facilities. Such authority as there is indicates that water
company activities are to be afforded exemptions from antitrust statutes,
although at least one decision says that an exclusive franchise to operate
a water system is invalidYP Other decisions suggest, if they do not
so hold, that monopoly can be tolerated in the water business.56 Some
of these cases are concerned merely with the. constitutionality of
statutes conferring an exclusive privilege to operate a waterworks and
the like. In Oakes v. Cattaraugus Water Co.,," however, the court
seemed to be conscious that it was dealing with a restraint of trade
problem. Defendant water company entered into a contract with the
plaintiff who agreed not to seek a franchise to operate a rival system
and to aid the defendant in the construction of its waterworks and
mains. Plaintiff performed his duties and sued defendant for non-
payment. Defendant pleaded the invalidity of the contract but the
51. Id. at 558, 84 N.E. at 102-03.
52. 124 App. Div. 401, 108 N.Y. Supp. 823 (1st Dep't 1908).
53. Id. at 406, 108 N.Y. Supp. at 826. See Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding
Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 358 (1931); Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. Lone Star Gas Co.,
289 Fed. 826, 832 (N.D. Tex. 1923); Rafferty v. Buffalo City Gas Co., 37 App. Div.
618, 622-23, 56 N.Y. Supp. 288, 291 (1st Dep't 1899) ; People ex rel. Municipal Gas
Co. v. Rice, 138 N.Y. 151, 33 N.E. 846 (1893); Motter v. Kennett Township Elec.
Co., 212 Pa. 613, 62 Atl. 104 (1905); State ex rel. Thompson v. Nashville Ry. &
Light Co., 151 Tenn. 77, 90-92, 268 S.W. 120, 124 (1925) ; Wheeling v. Natural Gas
Co., 74 W. Va. 372, 382-85, 82 S.E. 345, 349-50 (1914). Cf. People ex rel. Deneen
v. People's Gas Light & Coke Co., 205 Ill. 482, 496, 68 N.E. 950, 954 (1903) ; Capital
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Boynton, 137 Kan. 717, 22 P.2d 958 (1933).
54. E.g., ILa.. ANN. STAT. c. 111 2/3, § 10.3 (Smith-Hurd 1954).
55. Ennis Waterworks v. City of Ennis, 105 Tex. 63, 72, 144 S.W. 930, 934 (1912).
See also City of San Antonio v. San Antonio Irrigation Co., 118 Tex. 154, 165, 12
S.W.2d 546, 549-50 (1929) ; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Houston, 102 Tex. 317, 320-21,
116 S.W. 36, 37-38 (1909).
56. San Diego Water Co. v. San Diego Flume Co., 108 Cal. 549, 558-59, 41 Pac.
495, 498 (1895) ; Oakes v. Cattaraugus Water Co., 143 N.Y. 430, 38 N.E. 461 (1894);
White v. City of Meadville, 177 Pa. 643, 35 Atl. 695 (1896); Memphis v. Memphis
Water Co., 52 Tenn. 495, 530 (1871). See also State ex rel. Thompson v. Nashville
Ry. & Light Co., 151 Tenn. 77, 90-92, 268 S.W. 120, 124 (1925).
57. 143 N.Y. 430, 38 N.E. 461 (1894).
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court declared it to be valid; no reason could be found why the parties
could not agree that only one application should be made for a franchise.
In San Diego Water Co. v. San Diego Flume Co.,"s the court ap-
proved a contract whereby one company became a distributor of water
produced by another, on the ground that the resultant arrangement
was not obnoxious as a monopoly because rates could be controlled
by public authorityP9
TELEGRAPH
Telegraphic transmission of messages has been regulated almost as
long as railroading.' Federal legislation, sweeping in character, re-
quires the charging of just and reasonable rates, the filing of tariffs and
prohibits the granting of discriminations. The Federal Communica-
tions Commission is empowered to determine and prescribe what will
constitute a just and reasonable charge and to fix the maximum and
minimum or maximum or minimum charge.6' The Commission may
also approve consolidations and mergers, which are otherwise for-
bidden.'
Most of the early cases pertaining to the telegraph business had
to do with exclusive contracts for the erection of facilities along
railway rights-of-way. These decisions frequently condemned the
contracts, holding them illegal either at common law or under statutory
provisions, some of which dealt explicitly with the subject.' Little
mention was made of the existence of regulation and, instead, reliance
was placed upon the notion that transmission of telegraphic messages
is a public calling with which no exclusive arrangement should interfere.
In United States v. Western Union Tel. Co.," however, the court
took cognizance of the existence of regulation,' remarking that it was
not unmindful of the distinction between enterprises inherently public
in character and those of a private nature. The implication of the
remark was that the antitrust laws should be applied more rigorously
58. 108 Cal. 549, 41 Pac. 495 (1895).
59. Id. at 558-62, 41 Pac. at 498-99.
60. See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 1070, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-03
(1952); IL.. ANN. STATr. c. 111 213, §§ 1-10.5 (Smith-Hurd 1954).
61. 48 STAr. 1072 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 205 (a) (1952).
62. 57 STA'T. 5 (1943), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 222 (1952). See generally Note,
The Telegrap Industry: Monopoly or Competitio, 51 YAr L.J. 629, 637-38 (1942).
63. Union Tel. Co. v. Baltimore & 0. Tel. Co., 23 Fed. 12 (C.C.D. Ind. 1885);
Western Union Tel. Co. v. American Tel. Co., 65 Ga. 160, 162-63 (1880) ; St. Louis &
Cairo R.R. v. Postal Tel. Co., 173 Ill. 508, 524, 51 N.E. 382, 387 (1898); Mobile &
Ohio R.R. v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 76 Miss. 731, 753, 26 So. 370, 374 (1899); Jones
v. Carter, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 450, 101 S.W. 514 (1907). See also WPA, op. cit. mtpra
note 36, at Lrv.
64. 53 F. Supp. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
65. 53 F. Supp. at 383.
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to public utilities than to other business.66 Only one case has been
found in the state courts in which the regulated status of telegraph
companies has been recognized. In In re Jackson 67 the court pointed
out that telegraph companies enjoy special rights, powers and privileges
under regulatory legislation; it concluded that the legislature did not
contemplate the existence of competition in this business and that
monopoly was not condemned.
FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., the leading federal decision
concerned with the scope of antitrust principles in the area, involved a
radio telegraphy service rather than land lines but indicates the attitude
of the Commission and the courts. The Commission licensed a second
communication service from Portugal and the Netherlands on the
ground that the national policy favored competition whenever "reason-
ably feasible." The Supreme Court vacated the order of the Commis-
sion and remanded the case for a decision based more explicitly upon
the statutory standards of public convenience, including competition,
if the Commission deemed it desirable. The Commission, however,
was not to assume that competition was a necessary ingredient of the
national policy. In the course of its opinion, the Court said:
"The very fact that Congress has seen fit to enter into the com-
prehensive regulation of communications embodied in the Federal
Communications Act of 1934 contradicts the notion that national
policy unqualifiedly favors competition in communications." 69
TELEPHONE
Statutes empowering commissions to regulate telegraph companies
often apply as well to telephone enterprises. Such is the case with the
Federal Communications Act of 1934, which grants sweeping powers
to the Federal Communications Commission.7"
Despite the similarity in regulation, courts have displayed less of
a tendency to exempt telephone companies from antitrust principles
than they have with respect to telegraph companies. In fact, some
66. See also Union Pac. Ry. v. United States, 59 Fed. 813, 827 (8th Cir. 1894) ;
West Virginia Transp. Co. v. Ohio River Pipe Line Co., 22 W. Va. 600, 625 (1883).
67. 57 Misc. 1, 107 N.Y. Supp. 799 (N.Y. Co. 1903).
68. 346 U.S. 86 (1953).
69. 346 U.S. at 93. On remand, the Commission found that competition was
beneficial in international radio telegraphy; that it improved facilities and lowered
rates. It granted the license for the competitive service again. This time the Com-
mission's action was sustained. RCA Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 238 F.2d 24, 27
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1004 (1956). Cf. Ames v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 166 Fed. 820 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909) ; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Chicago & Paducah
R.R., 86 Ill. 246, 252 (1877). See also State ex rel. Thompson v. Nashville Ry. & Light
Co., 151 Tenn. 77, 90, 268 S.W. 120, 124 (1925).
70. See TRoxn, op. cit. supra note 42, at 100-02.
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courts have applied antitrust statutes and argued that such legislation
is particularly applicable to a- business following a common calling.71
In Central New York Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Averill7" the court struck
down a contract for exclusive telephone service at a hotel on this
ground.73  And in Union Trust & Say. Bank v. Kinloch Tel. Co.
7 4
the court said that:
"The ordinary rule that contracts in partial restraint of trade are
not invalid does not, however, apply to corporations engaged in
a public business in which all the public are interested. Whatever
tends to prevent competition between them or to create a monopoly
is unlawful." "
Perhaps more decisions, however, look in the opposite direction.7
Thus in McKinley Tel. Co. v. Cumberland Tel. Co.7" the court con-
sidered a contract dividing territory between two telephone companies.
The court refused to apply state antitrust statutes on the theory that
adoption of public utility legislation evidenced a policy of protecting
the public welfare through regulation. In the Illinois case of State
Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Romberg," American Telephone & Telegraph
Company had purchased the minority stock of a competing telephone
company. The purchase was approved by the Public Utility Com-
mission over the objection of minority shareholders who argued that
an article of the state constitution constituted a declaration of public
policy opposed to the maintenance of monopolies and that no statute
71. United States Tel. Co. v. Central Union Tel. Co., 171 Fed. 130 (N.D. Ohio
1909), aff'd, 202 Fed. 66 (6th Cir. 1913); Union Trust & Say. Bank v. Kinloch Tel.
Co., 258 Ill. 202, 101 N.E. 535 (1913); Louisville Home Tel. Co. v. Louisville, 130
Ky. 611, 113 S.W. 855, 861 (1908) ; Home Tel. Co. v. Grandy & Neisho Tel. Co., 147
Mo. App. 216, 126 S.W. 773 (1910), overruled by Home Tel. Co. v. Sarcoxie Light
& Tel. Co., 236 Mo. 114, 139 S.W. 108 (1911) ; Central New York Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Averill, 199 N.Y. 128, 92 N.E. 206 (1910).
72. 199 N.Y. 128, 92 N.E. 206 (1910).
73. 199 N.Y. at 130, 131, 92 N.E. at 207, 208. Cf. Cochranton Tel. Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 263 Pa. 506, 107 Atl. 23 (1919), disapproving the merger of two
competing telephone companies under a specific clause of the state constitution.
74. 258 Ill. 202, 101 N.E. 535 (1913).
75. 258 Ill. at 207-08, 101 N.E. at 537.
76. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Anderson, 196 Fed. 699 (E.D. Wash. 1912); State
Pub. Util. Comm'n ex rel. Clow v. Romberg, 275 Ill. 432, 114 N.E. 191 (1916);
Farmers' Co-op Tel. Co. v. Boswell Tel. Co., 187 Ind. 371, 119 N.E. 513 (1918);
Home Tel. Co. v. North Manchester Tel. Co., 47 Ind. App. 411, 92 N.E. 558 (1910) ;
Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. State ex reL. Attorney Gen., 100 Miss. 102, 54 So.
670 (1911); Whitiker v. Kilby, 55 Misc. 337, 106 N.Y. Supp. 511 (Onondago Co.
1907), aff'd mere., 122 App. Div. 895, 106 N.Y. Supp. 1149 (4th Dep't 1908) ; Mitchell
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 276 Pa. 390, 120 Atl. 447 (1923); Perry Tel. Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 265 Pa. 274, 279-80, 108 Atl. 659, 660-61 (1919); McKinley Tel. Co.
v. Cumberland Tel. Co., 152 Wis. 395, 140 N.W. 38 (1913).
77. 152 Wis. 359, 140 N.W. 38 (1913).
78. 275 Ill. 432, 114 N.E. 191 (1916).
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or action of the Commission thereunder could authorize the merger
of competing telephone companies." In reply to that contention the
state supreme court wrote:
"The interests of the public are not best served by competition in
the telephone business, but by the consolidation and merger of
competing lines and regulation as to rates and service by the State
or some agency thereof." I
In Farmers' Tel. Co. v. Boswell Co.,"' an Indiana case, plaintiff
company had a certificate of necessity and convenience for telephone
service from a state commission under a statute providing that no
second certificate should be issued without affording the plaintiff a
hearing with respect to the desirability thereof. Defendant secured
a franchise from a town and started to install its wires. It was held
that the construction of the rival telephone system should be enjoined
pending issuance of a certificate by the commission. And in Home
Tel. Co. v. Sarcozie Light & Tel. Co."' the Missouri court held valid
an exclusive agreement with respect to long distance service by the
operator of a local telephone exchange.
In 1949 the federal Attorney General filed an antitrust action
against the American Telephone & Telegraph Company and sub-
sidiary corporations. The parties entered a decree by consent and
hence no court ruled on the applicability of the federal antitrust statutes
to the regulated telephone industry. It is, however, interesting to note
that the consent decree entered sounds more like public utility regula-
tion than antitrust-enforced competition.8
ELECTRICITY
Production and distribution of electric power are heavily regu-
lated. Municipal governments exercise a considerable measure of au-
thority in the field.85 Most states have established administrative
79. Id. at 440, 114 N.E. at 194.
80. Id. at 445, 114 N.E. at 196.
81. 187 Ind. 371, 119 N.E. 513 (1918).
82. 236 Mo. 114, 139 S.W. 108 (1911), overading Home Tel. Co. v. Grandy &
Neosho Tel. Co., 147 Mo. App. 216, 126 S.W. 773 (1910). See also Wayne-Monroe
Tel. Co. v. Ontario Tel. Co., 60 Misc. 435, 441, 112 N.Y. Supp. 424, 428 (Wayne Co.
1908); Medina Farmers' Tel. Co. v. Medina County, 12 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 289 (Medina
Co. 1911); cases cited in Hadley, Public Utilities and the Anti-Trust Law, 10 B.U.L.
REv. 351, 362 n.26 (1930). Cf. Commonwealth Tel. Co. v. Carley, 192 Wis. 464, 468,
470, 213 N.W. 469, 470, 472 (1927), in which the doctrine of primary jurisdiction was
applied.
83. United States v. Western Elec. Co., CCH TRADE Ra. REP. (1956 Trade Cas.)
II 68, 246 (D.N.J. 1956). See Sheehan, Integration and Exclusion in the Teleptne
Equipment Induestry, 70 Q.J. EcoN. 249, 267 (1956).
84. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 111 2/3, § 10.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1957).
85. THI Tw ";NTH CQTuRY FuND, Ewx cic PoWaM AND GOVZ RNMZNT POLICY
54, 116 (1948).
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agencies to control rates,88 prescribe service standards, including mini-
mum voltage and frequency, 7 require extension of service within the
franchise area, prescribe uniform systems of accounting and depreciation
methods " and exercise other controls over suppliers of electric energy.
Interestingly enough, several state antitrust statutes specifically exempt
prices charged by electric utilities.8 9 Entry into the business is controlled
and almost universally a certificate of necessity and convenience, or other
similar license, is required from an administrative agency. Many such
agencies entertain applications for competing services only when the
utility serving a particular field is not furnishing adequate and satis-
factory service."
Account must also be taken of the Federal Power Act.91 Licens-
ing of hydroelectric construction projects is a key feature of the act.92
Transfer of facilities and merger or consolidation of utility companies
are also closely controlled. 3 The Federal Power Commission exercises
authority over certain rates " and may order the establishment of
connections between electric utilities and the interchange of energy
between them.95  Issuance of securities must have governmental ap-
proval.' And through the Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935 17 the breaking up, now largely accomplished, of combinations
of electric and other utilities is provided for. An official of the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission, charged with enforcement of the
Holding Company Act, indicated that the dissolution contemplated by
that act was not designed to promote competition:
"[T]he act does not prohibit combinations if the result . . . is
beneficial to the public interest. By the very nature of the utility
industry, which is a regulated monopoly, combinations frequently
are in the best interest of the public, provided that from the
economic point of view operating economies are produced." 98
86. Id. at 254.
87. See TRoxL, op. cit. suPra note 42, at 466.
88. Tnm TWrNT=1 r CtNTuRY FuxD, op. cit. .supra note 85, at 54.
89. E.g., CoLO. Fv. STAT. ANT. § 55-2-1 (1953).
90. E.g., Rockton Elec. Co. v. South Beloit Water, Gas & Elec. Co., 1921 P.U.R.
17, 21.
91. 49 STAT. 863 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 79 1a (1952).
92. 49 STAT. 840 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 797 (e) (1952).
93. 41 STAT. 1068 (1927), 16 U.S.C. § 801 (1952) ; 49 STAT. 841 (1935), 16 U.S.C.
§ 798 (1952). See, e.g., In re Scranton Elec. Co., 13 P.U.R.3d 552 (1956).
94. 49 STAT. 838, 842 (1935), 16 U.S.C. §§ 796, 800 (1952).
95. 49 STAT. 839 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 797 (1952).
96. 49 STAT. 841 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 798 (1952).
97. 49 STAT. 838 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1952).
98. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Study of Corporate Mergers of the
Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 477 (1956).
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Under this legislation the Securities & Exchange Commission has
allowed mergers which encouraged local monopolies in the production
of electricity. 9  Further complicating the question of the extent to
which antitrust principles are applicable to electric utilities is the fact
that state, federal and municipal governments have embarked on poli-
cies of public competition with privately owned utilities."°
Many courts insist that franchises granted to electric utilities have
a non-exclusive character, and hold that arrangements looking to the
maintenance of monopoly are invalid.1' 1 In other instances courts
have applied antitrust principles to a variety of trade-restraining prac-
tices indulged in by electric companies.0°  Other courts have found
no objection to the existence of monopoly in the supply and distribu-
tion of electric power. They have approved exclusive franchises and
sustained agreements eliminating competition. For example, in Idaho
Power & Light Co. v. Blomquist,103 a second electric power company
sought to build a plant in a town already served by a rival. The state
commission denied a certificate to the second company, and the court
affirmed:
"Under [the regulatory act] it must . . . be conceded that
competition with its disastrous effects is no longer needed to pro-
tect the public against unreasonable rates, hence there is no longer
any justification whatever for competition or the duplication of
utility plants under the pretense of preventing monopoly." 104
99. E.g., In re Derby Gas & Elec. Corp., 100 P.U.R. (n.s.) 542 (1953); In re
Electric Bond & Share Co., 95 P.U.R. (as.) 259 (1952).
100. Tig TwlWNT=gH CNuRIyUY FUND, oP. cit. supra note 85, at 386-89, 395.
101. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 139 (1939); Alabama
Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 480 (1938) ; Denver v. Hubbard, 17 Colo. App. 346
68 Pac. 993 (1902); State v. Central Power & Light Co., 139 Tex. 51, 161 S.W.2d
766 (1942) ; San Antonio Gas Co. v. State, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 118, 54 S.W. 289 (1899) ;
Clarksburg Elec. Light Co. v. Clarksburg, 47 W. Va. 739, 35 S.E. 994 (1900) ; People's
Land & Mfg. Co. v. Beyer, 161 Wis. 349, 154 N.W. 382 (1915). Compare Consoli-
dated Elec. Light Co. v. People's Elec. Light & Gas Co., 94 Ala. 372, 10 So. 440
(1892), with City of Crosbyton v. Texas-New Mexico Util. Co., 157 S.W.2d 418, 421-22
(Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
102. Citizens' Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Montgomery Light & Water Power
Co., 171 Fed. 553, 558 (C.C.M.D. Ala. 1909); State ex Tel. Spillman v. Interstate
Power Co., 118 Neb. 756, 226 N.W. 427 (1929). Recently a United States senator
delivered a diatribe against an alleged "monopoly" of electric power production and
distribution in the northwest United States. Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcom.
inittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 3, pt. 1, at
373-75 (1955).
103. 26 Idaho 222, 141 Pac. 1083 (1914).
104. Id. at 348-49, 141 Pac. at 1091. Accord, Illinois Power and Light Corp. v.
The Commerce Comm'n, 320 Ill. 427, 151 N.E. 236 (1926). Similar views prevailed
in People ex rel. New York Edison Co. v. Wilcox, 207 N.Y. 86, 100 N.E. 705 (1912);
Memphis Power & Light Co. v. Memphis, 172 Tenn. 346, 112 S.W.2d 817 (1933);
Holston River Elec. Co. v. Hydro Elec. Corp., 17 Tenn. App. 122, 66 S.W.2d 217
(1933) ; Hadley, supra note 82, at 354. But cf. Fogelsville & Trexlertown Elec. Co.
v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 271 Pa. 237, 114 AtI. 822 (1921) (when first public
utility has been granted franchise for a specific area, it cannot sit back and do nothing
indefinitely).
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Another example is State ex rel. Thompson v. Nashville Ry. & Light
Co.'0 5 Several rival companies supplying electric current had entered
into exclusive arrangements to generate and distribute electricity.
They formed a holding company to consolidate their interests and
secured approval thereof from the state public utility commission.
Thereafter an attempt was made to form a further holding company,
but a bill was filed to enjoin its creation on the theory that it would
violate the state antitrust statute. The court dismissed the bill, hold-
ing that the extensive powers granted the public utility commission
preempted the area, rendering inapplicable the antitrust act. °6
Recent litigation between a water company, a gas company (both
generators and distributors of electricity) and the Federal Power
Commission has brought the conflict between antitrust legislation
and regulation into sharp focus. The two companies had entered into
contracts for, inter alia, interchange of energy. The water company
was primarily a wholesaler, the gas company primarily a retailer, their
territories being contiguous. Relationships betwen the parties had been
before the Commission in four proceedings and the Commission had
found nothing objectionable about them. One of those proceedings
had specifically raised antitrust questions. Nevertheless, in Penn-
sylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas, Elec. Light & Power
Co.,"0 7 the agreement between the two utility companies was held
invalid under the Sherman Act in that it restrained trade. The court
found that, among other things, the agreement permitted the retailer to
control the wholesaler's prices, expansion plans and sales territory. It
wrote:
,'It has been suggested that although regulated industries are
not per se exempt from anti-trust laws, the statutes do not have the
same application to publicly regulated industries as they do to
private enterprises. . . . It is said that each utility has a legal
monopoly in its own field and there is no proof that the purpose
or effect of the agreement has been to raise or fix unreasonably the
prices of electric energy in the area served.
105. 151 Tenn. 77, 268 S.W. 120 (1925).
106. Id. at 90-91, 268 S.W. at 124. Generally in agreement are Montana-Dakota
Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 252-53 (1951) ; Weld v. Gas
and Elec. Light Comm'rs, 197 Mass. 556, 84 N.E. 101 (1908); Phelan v. Edison Elec.
Illuminating Co., 24 Misc. 109, 53 N.Y. Supp. 305 (1898); York Haven Water &
Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 287 Pa. 241, 134 Atl. 419 (1926). Note also that
the rule requiring competitive bidding for the purchase of supplies by a municipal
corporation is often relaxed when electric energy is involved, the courts taking the
position that regulation takes the place of competition in that field. Mullen v. Town of
Louisburg, 225 N.C. 53, 33 S.E.2d 484 (1945); Washington Fruit & Produce Co. v.
Yakima, 3 Wash. 2d 152, 100 P2d 8 (1940) ; Murphy v. Paull, 192 Wis. 93, 212 N.W.
402 (1927).
107. 184 F.2d 552 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 906 (1950).
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"This argument cannot be sustained. It does not give suffi-
cient weight to the decisions, in which the anti-trust acts have been
applied to utilities, or to the potential services which Penn Water
might render to the public if it were relieved of the contractual
restrictions upon its activities. . . . In short, the grant of
monopolistic privileges, subject to regulation by governmental
body, does not carry an exemption, unless one be expressly
granted, from the anti-trust laws, or deprive the courts of juris-
diction to enforce them." 108
Thereafter a proceeding was instituted before the Federal Power
Commission which issued its order in effect continuing the substance
of the contract between the companies which the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit had held invalid. That order was reviewed by the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and affirmed by the
United States Supreme Court.1"9 The Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia wrote:
"The Sherman Act . . . and related laws represent an attempt
to keep the channels of competition free so that prices and services
are determined by the workings of a free market. They derive
from the conviction that the greatest good to the greatest number
will be attained by preventing monopoly, monopolizing and com-
binations in restraint of trade. In marked contrast is a statute
such as Part H of the Federal Power Act. It evidences con-
gressional recognition that competition can assure protection of
the public interest only in an industrial setting which is conducive
to a free market and can have no place in industries which are
monopolies because of public grant, the exigencies of nature, or
legislative preference for a particular way of doing business. In
place of competition as a generalized and indirect regulator of
prices and services . . . Congress has substituted a regulatory
agency authorized to supervise almost every phase of the regu-
lated company's business. . . . These contrasting objectives in-
dicate that the antitrust laws can have only limited application to
industries regulated by specific statutes." 110
In affirming, the Supreme Court said that the order of the Federal
Power Commission did not require the parties to perform the contract
previously held to have violated the Sherman Act. It only required
that the parties conform to the terms of the Federal Power Com-
mission's order."' Mr. Justice Douglas wrote a bitter dissent, com-
108. Id. at 559-60.
109. Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. FPC, 193 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1951),
aff'd, 343 U.S. 414 (1952).
110. 193 F.2d at 234.
111. 343 U.S. at 422.
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plaining that the Federal Power Commission had placed its blessing
upon an "unholy alliance" between the two utility companies., 2
The matter came back before the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit under a different caption." 3 The court adhered to its position
that public utility companies are wholly subject to the antitrust laws
and held invalid a contract between the parties creating a joint sub-
sidiary, over the argument of intervenor Federal Power Commission
that it had the right to grant exemption from the antitrust laws to a
water power utility." 4
MOTOR CARRIERS
States have engaged in extensive regulation of all motor vehicles,
whether operated for pleasure or profit, with a view to the maintenance
of safety on the highways. In addition, many have enacted measures
providing "economic' regulation."" Thus a statute provides that the
Illinois Commerce Commission shall fix rates for common carriers and
minimum rates for contract carriers."" Common carriers can only
operate if they have certificates of necessity and convenience while
contract carriers must have permits." 7  The Commission is to control
merger, transfer and the acquisition of control of carriers."' The
interstate aspects of trucking are controlled by the Interstate Commerce
Commission under the terms of Interstate Commerce Act." 9 That
statute provides that the federal tribunal may fix both maximum and
minimum or maximum or minimum rates for common carriers and
minimum rates for contract carriers.' °  It also provides for detailed
regulation of most of the same aspects of trucking covered by state law,
including service, safety, licensing, financing and the like.'" An inter-
112. Id. at 424-26.
113. Consolidated Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Pennsylvania Water & Power
Co., 194 F.2d 89 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 963 (1952).
114. 194 F.2d at 95, 98. The same tribunal, however, lacked the courage to award
treble damages to the company which it had found victimized by the illegal contract.
Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 209
F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 960 (1954). Applying the doctrine of
in pari delicto, the court held that Pennsylvania Water could not recover treble
damages from Consolidated Gas by reason of the violation of the Sherman Act,
despite Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
Subsequent proceedings are reported as Re Pennsylvania Water & Power Co., 9
P.U.R3d 167 (1955).
115. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAr. c.,95 1/2, §§ 282.1-.30 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1957).
116. Id. § 282.4.
117. Id. §§ 282.5-.6.
118. Id. § 282.13.
119. 49 STAT. 543 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-27 (1952).
120. 49 STAT. 558, 561 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 316 (e), 318 (b) (1952).
121. See Meck & Bogue, Federal Regulation of Motor Carrier Unification, 50
YAL L.J. 1376, 1381-83 (1941).
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esting feature of both state and federal licensing is the existence of
"grandfather" clauses permitting those already in the business at the
time regulation begins to receive certificates of necessity and con-
venience without Commission findings of public need. 2'
We find surprisingly little litigation with respect to the applicability
of antitrust laws to the operations of motor carriers. Norfolk So. Bus
Corp. v. Virginia Dare Transp. Co.' appears to hold squarely that
truckers are subject at the same time to the Interstate Commerce Act
and the Sherman Act. The court held illegal under the Sherman Act
a contract between two motor carriers providing one with free terminal
and handling service at the expense of the other if the first restricted
its operations to two round trips per week between named points. If
it did not so restrict itself, the first carrier was required by the con-
tract to pay for the terminal and handling services. Both companies
operated on the same route. The court did not make it clear whether it
thought approval of the contract by the ICC would have washed out the
Sherman Act violation, but held that the contract violated the Interstate
Commerce Act because not submitted to the ICC for prior approval. 2
The Supreme Court's attitude toward Commission-approved ar-
rangements is indicated by McLean Trucking Co. v. United States 125
in which it affirmed the lower court's refusal to set aside a Commission
order permitting the merger of seven east coast truckers. The Com-
mission had made a finding with respect to the merger's effect upon
competition, but had taken this into account as merely one of several
factors in determining the public interest. In approving this procedure,
the Court rejected the argument that the Interstate Commerce Act
should be interpreted to permit mergers having an adverse effect upon
competition only when absolutely necessary to effectuate the national
transportation policy. 6 Justice Douglas, dissenting, would have re-
solved the apparent conflict between the Sherman Act and the Interstate
Commerce Act by adopting the interpretation rejected by the
majority.
2 7
Another case of interest is State ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v.
Inland Forwarding Corp.18  The state constitution forbade monopoly,
122. George, Supreme Court Views Federal Authorization. and Merging of Motor
Carriers, 26 LAND ECON. 183 (1950).
123. 159 F.2d 306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 827 (1947).
124. Id. at 311.
125. 321 U.S. 67 (1944).
126. Id. at 78-79. Cf. ICC v. Parker, 326 U.S. 60 (1945), one of a series of deci-
sions involving the power of the ICC to license railways to enter into auxiliary trucking
services.
127. 321 U.S. at 94.
128. 164 Wash. 412, 2 P2d 888 (1931).
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but a statute required the grant of a certificate of public convenience
and necessity before one could operate freight trucks on the highway.
A second certificate over the same route could be issued only when the
existing service was found to be inadequate. Holding the statute valid,
the court found that it did not authorize the type of monopoly pro-
scribed by the constitution.'
WATER CARRIERS
Operators of steamship lines, barge routes and the like may be
subject to regulation under state statutes.130 As a practical matter
most of the regulatory activity is centered in the federal government
where jurisdiction is divided; domestic water carriers are subject to
control under the terms of the Interstate Commerce Act 11 and those
engaged in foreign commerce are subject to control by the Maritime
Commission under the terms of the Shipping Act " and the Merchant
Marine Act."a Most of the litigation with which we are concerned
appears to have arisen under the Shipping Act. That statute prohibits
discriminatory rates, including exclusive dealing rebates and the like.
13 4
It provides that common carriers by water are to file copies of agree-
ments with rival carriers and that the Commission may revoke such
agreements, which shall only be lawful if approved. It then provides:
"Every agreement, modification, or cancellation lawful under this sec-
tion shall be excepted from [the antitrust laws]." '35 Subsequent sec-
tions prohibit discriminatory charges 136 and empower the Maritime
Commission to prescribe "just and reasonable" rates. 37
In the absence of statute, water carriers appear to be subject to the
normal common-law rules against restraints of trade. Thus in Ander-
son v. Tett,13 8 the court declared illegal an agreement between owners
of competing steamboats to share profits by a formula set forth in the
129. Id. at 419-22, 2 P2d at 891-92.
130. E.g., I.L. ANN. STAT. c. 111 2/3, §§ 10.3, 10.4 (Smith-Hurd 1954).
131. 54 STAT. 929 (1940), 49 U.S.C. §§ 901-23 (1952).
132. 39 STAT. 728 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-42 (1952).
133. 41 STAT. 988 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 861-89 (1952).
134. 39 STAT. 733 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 812 (1952).
135. 39 STAT. 733 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1952).
136. 39 STAT. 734 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 815-16 (1952).
137. 39 STAT. 735 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 817 (1952). Section 29 (b)
of the Merchant Marine Act provides: "Nothing contained in the antitrust laws ...
shall be construed as declaring illegal an association entered into by marine insurance
companies for the following purposes: To transact the marine insurance and reinsur-
ance business in the United States and in foreign countries and to reinsure or otherwise
apportion among its membership the risks undertaken by such association or any one
of the component members." 41 STAT. 1000 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 885 (b) (1952).
138. 89 Ky. 375, 12 S.W. 670 (1889). Under a specific constitutional clause a
similar result was reached in Manson v. Hunt, 82 Wash. 291, 144 Pac. 45 (1914).
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contract. In several cases the courts appear to have assumed that
water carriers were subject to the prohibitions of the antitrust laws
without expressly considering the existence of regulation or discussing
the issue.139
Other courts have been more tolerant of restraints in this field.140
What has revolutionized the application of the antitrust statutes to
water carriers, however, is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. In
a series of decisions of gradually expanding scope, the courts have held
that antitrust suits should be dismissed in favor of proceedings before
the regulatory commissions. 14' As matters stand, therefore, many
litigants, including the Attorney General, seeking to rely upon rights
created by antitrust statutes, will find themselves relegated to litigation
before an administrative agency charged with the economic regulation
of the water carrier defendant. Although such decisions do not ex-
pressly negative the applicability of antitrust statutes, they imply a
broad tolerance of agency-approved conduct.
AIR CARRIERS
State control of aviation is relatively insignificant." The impor-
tant federal statute is the Civil Aeronautics Act 1 which provides for
comprehensive regulation of the air transport industry. Among other
matters, the Civil Aeronautics Board is directed to see that every air
carrier maintains just and reasonable rates.' The Board controls
mergers and abandonments.' A section of the act contains detailed
prohibitions against diversification on the part of air carriers, preventing
them from becoming associated with rail, water and motor carriers."
Air carriers are also forbidden to become affiliated with manufacturers
139. United States v. Inter-Island Nay. Co., 87 F. Supp. 1010 (D. Hawaii 1950);
Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), appeal dismissed,
336 U.S. 941 (1949). Cf. Stewart v. Erie & Western Transp. Co., 17 Minn. 348 (1871);
Lough v. Outerbridge, 143 N.Y. 271, 38 N.E. 292 (1894).
140. Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Chicago & Alton R.R., 73 Mo. 389, 407-08, 410-11
(1881); KIitsap County Transp. Co. v. Manitou Ferry Ass'n, 176 Wash. 486, 30 P.2d
233 (1934).
141. Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 573-76 (1952) ; United
States Nay. Co. v. Cunard S.S., 284 U.S. 474, 481-82 (1932); American Union
Transp., Inc. v. River Plate & Brazil Conferences, 126 F. Supp. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1954),
aff'd per curiam, 222 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1955) ; United States v. Alaska S.S., 110 F.
Supp. 104 (W.D. Wash. 1952). Cf. Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 883,
889 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd by an equally divided Court sub num. Rederi v. Isbrandtsen
Co., 342 U.S. 950 (1952).
142. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 111 2/3, § 10.3 (Smith-Hurd 1954); ILL. ANN. STAT.
c. 15 112, § 22 (Smith-Hurd 1951).
143. 52 STAT. 973 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §§ 401-722 (1952).
144. 52 STAT. 993 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 484 (a) (1952.)
145. 52 STAT. 987, 1001 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §§ 481 (k), 488 (1952).
146. 52 STAT. 1002 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 489 (1952).
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of aircraft. In a somewhat contradictory vein, the statute appears to
contemplate that air carriers may make price-fixing agreements with
their competitors because it provides for the filing of such contracts
with the Board. 1 7 One section stipulates that in the exercise of its
powers, the Board shall consider the following, among other things,
as being in the public interest:
"(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound
development of an air-transportation system properly adapted to
the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United
States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense .... ," 148
Any person affected by an order made under specified sections of the
act is relieved from the operation of the antitrust laws. 49 Lastly, it
should be observed that provision is made for the payment of sub-
sidies to air carriers."'5 In a recent year as much as $25,000,000 was
so expended,' thus giving the Government a substantial stake in the
economic well-being of the industry.
As noted above, the federal legislation contains an express exemp-
tion from antitrust coverage and the courts have had at least one op-
portunity to apply it.' Activity outside the express exemption con-
tained in the statute has been considered within the purview of the
antitrust laws,' unless a specific remedy is granted under the terms
of the Civil Aeronautics Act. In Apgar Travel Agency, Inc. v. Inter-
national Ass'n, for example, which alleged a conspiracy to destroy
plaintiff's business because of its representation of non-scheduled car-
riers, the court denied defendant's motion to dismiss the case on
the ground that primary jurisdiction existed in the Civil Aeronautics
Board. Instead, it was held that the suit should be stayed pending action
before that tribunal. Recognizing that the economic conduct of air
carriers was a matter subject to the detailed and comprehensive regula-
tion of the Board185 and that national policy did not favor unbridled
competition in the industry, the court said that the antitrust laws were
superseded by regulatory statutes only to the extent of the repugnancy
147. 52 STAT. 1004 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 492 (1952).
148. 52 STAT. 980 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 402 (1952).
149. 52 STAr. 1004 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 494 (1952).
150. 52 STA'. 998 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 486 (1952).
151. WiLcox, PuBLic PoLIcy ToivARD BusINEss 637-38 (1955).
152. Putnam v. Air Tramp. Ass'n, 112 F. Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
153. S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Tramp. Ass'n, 191 F.2d 658, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1951) ; Apgar
Travel Agency, Inc. v. International Air Tramp. Ass'n, 107 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y.
1952) ; Slick Airways, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J. 1951),
rehearing denied, 107 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J. 1952).
154. 107 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
155. Id. at 709.
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between them." Since the Civil Aeronautics Act made no provision
for the remedy of damages, that remedy provided under the antitrust
laws remained unaffected. 1 7  In Slick Airways, Inc. v. American Air-
lines, Inc.'0 8 the court denied a motion to dismiss on the ground primary
jurisdiction existed in the Civil Aeronautics Board and in effect held
that the case should proceed. It found that the Board enjoyed no
power to award damages or reparations for violation of the Civil Aero-
nautics Act ... and hence concluded that a remedy must be available
to the plaintiff in the courts. However, in S. S. W., Inc. v. Air Transp.
Ass'n ... it was held that although plaintiff had a remedy in the courts
for damages, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction required that with
respect to the injunction sought the case be stayed pending Civil Aero-
nautics Board disposition of proceedings seeking injunctive relief.
There emerges, therefore, a reasonably clear picture that the antitrust
laws are considered fully applicable to air carriers unless the activity
complained of falls precisely within the scope of the statutory exemp-
tion. If, however, the relief sought could be afforded by the Civil
Aeronautics Board, the parties will be required to proceed before that
tribunal and exhaust their remedies there before securing judicial relief.
TRANSIT
Transportation of persons by means of streetcars, buses and other
vehicles has long been the subject of governmental regulation-.10 There
has been considerable litigation with respect to the application of anti-
trust principles to regulated transit systems.
Some decisions reflect the view that exclusive franchises are il-
legal either at common law or under specific constitutional provisions. 62
In Jones v. Carter,'6 the original land owner platted a town and re-
served to himself the right to operate street railways, a telephone
system, telegraph system, waterworks, gas works, steam heat service,
sewage service, electric service and storm sewers. The reservation was
held unlawful.
156. Id. at 711.
157. Ibid.
158. 107 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J. 1951).
159. Id. at 205.
160. 191 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
161. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 111 2/3, §§ 10.3, 10.4 (Smith-Hurd 1954).
162. Birmingham & Pratt Mines Street Ry., 79 Ala. 465 (1885) ; Jones v. Carter,
45 Tex. Civ. App. 450, 101 S.W. 514 (1907).
163. 45 Tex. Civ. App. 450, 101 S.W. 514 (1907).
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Other decisions treat agreements between operators of rival street
railways systems as subject to antitrust principles.164 In several in-
stances the courts have discussed the issue as if antitrust statutes were
applicable but reached the conclusion that the contract or practice in
question did not fall within the prohibitions of such legislation."' It
is also worth noting that as early as 1889 specific state antitrust statutes
forbade the consolidation of street railways. 66
The weight of authority plainly looks in the other direction.
1'67
Most of these cases involve the grant of certificates of necessity and
convenience or the enjoining of rival transportation service. Thus in
Princeton Power Co. v. Calloway,168 an established electric inter-urban
railway was granted an injunction against the competition of jitneys
on a parallel route. Monongahela West Penn Pub. Serv. Co. v. State
Road Comm'n,"'69 a West Virginia case, held that it was improper to
grant a certificate of convenience and necessity to a new bus line when
the existing bus lines and railways provided adequate service.
The Illinois decisions are particularly instructive. In South
Chicago City Ry. v. Calumet Elec. Street Ry., 70 the Illinois court held
that proprietors of transit systems should compete with each other and
164. Trust Co. v. State, 109 Ga. 736, 35 S.E. 323 (1900); South Chicago City
Ry. v. Calumet Elec. Street Ry., 171 Ill. 391, 49 N.E. 576 (1898) ; Schultz v. Johnson,
110 N.J. Eq. 566 (Ct. Err. & App. 1932); Scott v. Farmers' & Merchants Nat'l Bank,
97 Tex- 31, 75 S.W. 7 (1903).
165. Fleetway, Inc. v. Public Serv. Interstate Transp. Co., 72 F2d 761 (3d Cir.
1934); Southern Elec. Securities Co. v. State, 91 Miss. 195, 44 So. 785 (1907);
Brooklyn Elevated R.R. v. Brooklyn B. & W.E. R.R., 23 App. Div. 29, 48 N.Y. Supp.
665 (2d Dep't 1897), nwdified, 23 App. Div. 625, 48 N.Y. Supp. 1101 (2d Dep't 1897).
Cf. State ex rel. Pitcairn v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 232 Mo. App. 535, 111 S.W.2d 222
(1937), in which the court said that a certificate of convenience and necessity should
be issued to a bus line even though rail service were adequate, if the commission
found public convenience would be promoted. Id. at 545, 111 S.W.2d at 228-29.
166. WPA, STATE ANTITRUST LAWS LV (Martin ed. 1940).
167. Continental Securities Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 207 Fed. 467
(S.D.N.Y. 1913) ; Burgess v. Mayor of Brockton, 235 Mass. 95, 126 N.E. 456 (1920) ;
Matter of Interborough-Metropolitan Co., 125 App. Div. 804, 110 N.Y. Supp. 186
(1st Dep't 1908) ; Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 112 Ohio St. 699,
148 N.E. 921 (1925); Day v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Co., 80 Wash. 161, 141 Pac. 347
(1914) ; Wood v. Seattle, 23 Wash. 1, 62 Pac. 135 (1900) ; Monongahela West Penn
Pub. Serv. Co. v. State Road Comm'n, 104 W. Va. 183, 139 S.E. 744 (1927); Poca-
hontas Transp. Co. v. Craft, 100 W. Va. 240, 130 S.E. 468 (1925) ; Princeton Power
Co. v. Calloway, 99 W. Va. 157, 128 S.E. 89 (1925). Other cases apparently taking
the same view include Wilmington City Ry. v. Wilmington & Brandywine Ry., 8
Del. Ch. 468, 46 At. 12 (Ch. 1900); People v. Chicago, 349 Ill. 304, 182 N.E. 419
(1932); Chicago Motor Bus Co. v. Chicago Stage Co., 287 Ill. 320, 122 N.E. 477
(1919); Venner v. Chicago City Ry., 258 Ill. 523, 101 N.E. 949 (1913); Indianapolis
Cable Street Ry. v. Citizens Street Ry., 127 Ind. 369, 24 N.E. 1054 (1890) ; Harrison
v. Big Four Bus Lines, 217 Ky. 119, 288 S.W. 1049 (1926) ; State ex rel. Thompson
v. Nashville Ry. & Light Co., 151 Tenn. 77, 268 S.W. 120 (1924); Note, Recent
Statutes Relating to Carriers, 24 COLUm. L. tv. 528 (1924).
168. 99 W. Va. 157, 128 S.E. 89 (1925).
169. 104 W. Va. 183, 139 S.E. 744 (1927). Cf. Whittaker v. Southeastern Grey-
hound Lines, 314 Ky. 131, 234 S.W.2d 174 (1950); State v. Queen City Coach Co.,
233 N.C. 119, 63 S.E.2d 113 (1951); Intercity Auto Stage Co. v. Bothell Bus Co., 139
Wash. 674, 247 Pac. 1040 (1926).
170. 171 Ill. 391, 49 N.E. 576 (1898).
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that contracts leading toward monopoly were invalid. Apparently that
decision has been overruled sub silentio, for many recent decisions reach
contrary results. Thus West Suburban Transp. Co. v. Chicago & West
Towns Ry.,' 7' held that no license should be granted to operate a com-
peting bus line when an existing trolley line provided adequate service.
"Where one company can serve the public conveniently and effi-
ciently it has been found from experience that to authorize a com-
peting company to serve the same territory ultimately results in
requiring the public to pay more for transportation, in order that
both companies may receive a fair return on the money invested
and the cost of operation." 172
There presently appears to be little scope for the application of anti-
trust principles in litigation involving the operation of transit lines.
TAxis
It has long been the practice to license and regulate operators of
cabs, whether horse or motor propelled. Today authority to control
taxi cabs is perhaps most frequently exercised by municipal corpora-
tions, but state commissions sometimes enjoy such powers.' Most of
the decisions involving the hack men have turned upon the validity of
exclusive contracts for the privilege of standing at railway depots.
Some decisions hold exclusive rights and similar arrangements il-
legal, either at common law or under statutes. 4  In one case, United
States v. Yellow Cab Co.,"7 the federal antitrust laws were applied
directly to companies operating taxi cabs2 However, only passing
reference was made to the licensing of the cabs and the regulation
thereof; the case focused on sales made to cab-operating companies by
affiliated manufacturing concerns. The case was sent back for trial and
the district court found the facts to favor the defendants. 7 6
171. 309 Ill. 87, 140 N.E. 56 (1923).
172. Id. at 92, 140 N.E. at 58. Accord, Chicago Rys. v. Commerce Comm'n, 336
Ill. 51, 167 N.E. 840 (1929); Bartonville Bus Line v. Eagle Motor Coach Line, 326
Ill. 200, 157 N.E. 175 (1927); Choate v. Commerce Comm'n, 309 Ill. 248, 141 N.E. 12
(1923).
173. E.g., ILL. ANN. S~TAT. c. 24, § 23-51 (Smith-Hurd 1942).
174. North Little Rock Transp. Co. v. North Little Rock 207 Ark. 976, 184 S.W.
2d 52 (1944); Indianapolis Ry. v. Dohn, 153 Ind. 10, 53 N.E. 937 (1899); J.H. Fields
v. Holland & Son, 158 Ky. 544, 165 S.W. 699 (1914) ; Palmer Transfer Co. v. Ander-
son, 131 Ky. 217, 115 S.W. 182 (1909); McConnell v. Pedigo & Hays, 92 Ky. 465,
18 S.W. 15 (1892).
175. 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
176. 80 F. Supp. 936 (N.D. Ill. 1948), aff'd, 338 U.S. 338 (1949). Mr. Justice
Black and Mr. Justice Reed dissented from the affirmance saying that the evidence
indicated higher prices had been paid for cabs by operating companies than if they had
been purchased on the free market. This argument suggests that the defendants were
seeking to avoid the impact of regulation by inflating their costs. Cf. Yellow Cab Co.
UTILITIES AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS
Perhaps the greater number of decisions favors the view that regu-
lation precludes the application of antitrust principles. In any event the
United States Supreme Court so found the weight of authority thirty
years ago in Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxi-
cab Co. 177  That case did not deal directly with the effect of regulation
upon antitrust principles but the Court sustained an exclusive agreement
saying that there was no showing of a lack of proper public service
resulting from the contract. Despite the number of cases approving
exclusive agreements and the like in private suits, it is not wholly clear
that a majority of the courts would hold proprietors of taxicabs to be
exempt from antitrust prosecution at the suit of a state or federal
attorney general. The opinions do not purport to rest upon the exist-
ence of regulation and the one important federal antitrust case does not
even consider the possibility that an exemption would be availableY.7 9
Hence the state of the law in this area must be considered uncertain.
BROADCASTING
As in the case of aeronautics, the federal government exercises al-
most exclusive control over the transmission of AM, FM and TV
broadcasts.' The statute under which the Federal Communications
Commission operates is the Comunications Act of 1934,'18 a principal
feature of which is its provision for the licensing of broadcasters.8 2
The number of frequencies upon which messages may be transmitted
is limited and hence licensing is necessary to prevent signal interference.
Since the power and location of the stations may create interference,
the Commission also has power to classify radio stations and to pre-
v. Chicago, 396 Ill. 388, 71 N.E.2d. 652 (1947), in which the court sustained the
validity of an ordinance limiting the number of taxis, fixing the fares that might be
charged, regulating the hours of the drivers and the like on the ground that the
ordinance did not confer an illegal monopoly because there were many licensees and the
number could be increased after hearings and findings of public necessity. See also
Pennsylvania Co. v. Chicago, 181 II. 289, 54 N.E. 825 (1899).
177. 276 U.S. 518, 526-29 (1928).
178. Id. at 529. Among the decisions upon which the Supreme Court relied were
Union Depot & Ry. Co. v. Meeking, 42 Colo. 89, 94 Pac. 16 (1908) ; Old Colony R.R.
v. Tripp, 147 Mass. 35, 17 N.E. 89 (1888) ; Thompson's Express Co. v. Whitemore, 88
N.J. Eq. 535, 102 Atl. 692 (Ct. Err. & App. 1917); Brown v. N.Y.C. & H.R.R., 75
Hun. 355 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1894); Rose v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 75 W. Va. 1, 83 S.E.
85 (1914). Cf. Hart v. Atlanta Terminal Co., 128 Ga. 754, 58 S.E. 452 (1907); Capitol
Taxicab Co. v. Cermak, 60 F.2d 608, 612 (N.D. Ill. 1932) ; Hedding v. Gallagher, 72
N.H. 377, 57 Atl. 225 (1903) ; Parsons v. Galveston, 125 Texas 568, 84 S.W.2d 996
(1935); Gill v. Dallas, 209 S.W. 209 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919). See also Delaware,
Lackawanna & Western R.R. v. Morristown, 276 U.S. 182, 194 (1928).
179. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
180. TRoxm, EcoNomIcs ov PuBLie U 'lic S 509 (1947).
181. 48 STAT. 1081-82 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-03 (Supp. IV, 1957).
182. 48 STAT. 1081 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. IV, 1957).
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scribe the nature of their service, to fix the locations of their trans-
mitters, to assign frequencies, to regulate their apparatus, to fix the
power they may employ and to specify the times during which they
may operate."s It is directed to deny a license to any one who has been
adjudged to have monopolized radio communication. The statute also
specifically provides:
"All laws of the United States relating to unlawful restraints and
monopolies and to combinations, contracts, or agreements in re-
straint of trade are hereby declared to be applicable to .
interstate or foreign radio communications." 184
Upon conviction of a violation of the antitrust laws a licensee under
the statute is to lose his permission to broadcast. Furthermore, a radio
licensee is not to acquire telephone, telegraph or cable interests if the
effect is substantially to lessen competition.ls" While the Commission
enjoys power to restrict entry into the business, it does not fix the
prices at which the products (advertising) may be sold; the statute
specifically contemplates the continuance of competition in broadcast-
ing. In practice, the Commission grants licenses freely,""0 but some-
times withholds a permit even though a frequency is available when
the station does not appear to enjoy a reasonable expectation of success.
It has also adopted rules limiting the number of licenses available to
any party (including parties under common ownership) in an effort to
avoid what it refers to as "concentration of control." 187 Particular
attention has been paid to network affiliation of radio and television
broadcasters. Under one section the Commission is empowered to
make regulations applicable to the licensees with respect to their network
affiliations. 88 As a result, the Commission has prohibited exclusive
network affiliation, required that contracts for affiliation be limited to
a two year term, controlled "option time" and insisted that the station
proprietors have the right to reject programs. 8 9
183. 48 STAT. 1082 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (Supp. IV, 1957).
184. 48 Sr 'r. 1087 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 313 (Supp. IV, 1957).
185. 48 STAT. 1087 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 313-14 (Supp. IV, 1957).
186. TROXI L, op. cit. supra note 180, at 515-16. There has been much controversy
and some litigation with respect to the licensing of proprietors of newspapers to
operate radio and television stations. See Stahlman v. FCC, 126 F.2d 124, 127 (D.C.
Cir. 1942). Cf Clarksburg Publishing Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1955). See
also Goldin, Economic and Regulatory Problems in the Broadcast Field, 30 LAND
EcoN. 223, 232 (1954).
187. 47 C.F.R. §§ 3.35, 3.240 (Supp. 1957).
188. 48 STAT. 1082 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (i) (Supp. IV, 1957).
189. 47 C.F.R. §§ 3.131-.133 (Supp. 1957), sustained in United States v. Storer
Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956). In recent years there has been bitter controversy
with respect to the allocation of "channels" for broadcasting of television programs.
The Commission "intermixed" VHF licenses with UHF licenses. Since the UHF
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In view of the statutory provision declaring that the antitrust laws
should be applicable to the broadcasting business, the courts usually
hold the industry fully subject to that legislation. The Court held in
the leading case of FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station,"9 that result-
ing economic injury to an existing station is not an element the Com-
mission must weigh in passing on applications for a new broadcasting
license. In the course of the opinion the Court noted the difference
in treatment accorded telephonic and telegraphic communication and
broadcasting by the Communications Act, broadcasting being recog-
nized as a field of free competition.'91
Nevertheless, one notes some reluctance to apply antitrust legis-
lation vigorously against broadcasters. In the first place, Federal
Broadcasting System v. American Broadcasting Co. 9 2 hints that the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction may be applicable. Plaintiff operated
a broadcasting station which had been served by two networks, but
according to the allegations of the complaint the plaintiff refused to
enter into exclusive affiliation with either one. Thereafter both net-
works made other arrangements and plaintiff was not able to secure any
network programs. Suit was brought against several major networks
alleging a conspiracy to drive the plaintiff out of business, and seeking
an injunction pendente lite to compel the rendition of network service.
An injunction was denied and the court of appeals affirmed, saying:
"We think it improper to grant a preliminary injunction upon
the charge that the networks have unlawful 'exclusive' contracts
with their stations where the Federal Communications Commis-
sion, after protracted hearings and consideration not only of the
general public interest but of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, has
specifically sanctioned many of the important terms of the affil-
iation contracts at present in use and the defendants have given
reasonable grounds for denying their exclusiveness or illegal-
ity." 193
signal is weaker than the VHF signal and since most receivers are not equipped to
UHF transmission, the proprietors of the UHF stations have been handicapped. There
has, therefore, been less utilization of the UHF frequency range than might have been
possible had no licenses been granted to the VHF stations.
190. 309U.S. 470 (1940).
191. Id. at 474. Cf. FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 362
(1955) ; Clarksburg Publishing Co. v. FCC, 225 F2d 511, 518-19 (D.C. Cir. 1955). By
way of contrast, common carriers engaged in the transmission of messages by radio-
telegraph appear to enjoy a regulated monopoly status. FCC v. RCA Communications,
Inc., 346 U.S. 86 (1953); Mackey Radio & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 97 F.2d 641, 643 (D.C.
Cir. 1938). See also National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 222
(1943) ; Television Transmission, Inc. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 47 Cal. 2d 82, 301 P.2d
862 (1956); H.R. Rim1. No. 607, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 95-97 (1957); Hansen, State-
meit on Antitrust Activities in the Field of Television, 2 ANTiaRus'" Bt.. 99, 105
(1956).
192. 167 F.2d 349 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 821 (1948).
193. Id. at 352.
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In the second place, while it is often-repeated doctrine that licensees
have no property interests in the transmission channels assigned to them
by the Commission, the cases appear to recognize that the licensee has at
least a right to a hearing before the channel is taken and awarded to a
rival. 9  And not too long ago the Attorney General of the United
States wrote as follows:
.. . we observe that the concepts 'regulation' and 'free com-
petition' . . . are anti-thetical. . . Maintenance of a completely
competitive market requires that opportunity to enter the market
be unrestricted. The telecasting business is not an industry in
which unrestrained freedom to enter exists. . . . Consequently,
the interpretation of the antitrust laws in cases involving tele-
casters must take into account the fact that entry is regulated by
the Government." ""
INSURANCE
Prior to 1944 control over insurance companies was exclusively
a concern of state governments. Almost every state had enacted
legislation designed to protect policyholders, and administrative officers
were active in varying degrees to that end." The Illinois statute,
which is perhaps typical, provides for detailed control over insurance
companies, including provisions otherwise commonly found in business
corporation statutes with respect to minimum capital and the like. The
state controls the forms of policies issued, prohibits misrepresentations
with respect to such policies, prescribes rates for different types of
insurance and requires the filing of tariffs1 97 Deceptive acts and prac-
tices are forbidden, the director of insurance may control interlocking
directorates and discrimination in the payment of premiums is pro-
hibited.'98
Notwithstanding the fact that the states have long regulated in-
surance in one degree or another, the courts almost always held
insurance companies subject to antitrust principles. Indeed, some
194. Clarksburg Publishing Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Metro-
politan Television Co. v. United States, 221 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ; Colorado Radio
Corp. v. FCC, 118 F.2d 24, 26 (D.C. Cir. 1941). See also FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio
Station, 309 U.S. 470, 476 (1940); Note, The "Fringe Area" of Public Utilities, 58
W. VA. L. Rmv. 390, 397 (1956).
195. Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
84th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 404 (1956). But cf. Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 180
F.2d 28, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
196. E.g., ILL. A N. SrAr. c. 73, §§ 613-15 (Smith-Hurd 1940); PATTFRsoN, Tnt
INSURANC4 COMMISSIOneR IN THX UNIM STATrS (1927).
197. ILL ANN. STAT. c. 73, § 755 (Smith-Hurd 1940) ; id. §§ 761, 1065.1-.2, 1065.4
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1957).
198. Id. § 976 (Smith-Hurd 1940); id. §§ 761, 767.1, 1065.16 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1957).
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state antitrust legislation specifically refers to insurers. 9' Many
courts simply apply antitrust statutes to insurance companies without
even referring to the existence of the regulatory legislation.2'
A few decisions have taken account of the special status of the
insurance industry. In Illinois, People v. Aachen & Munich Fire Ins.
Co." sustained the validity of a bill to enjoin price-fixing by insurance
companies. The defendants argued that insurance was not a public
utility and hence that the common law against conspiracies and re-
straint of trade did not apply to them." 2  The court enjoined the
conspiracy, however, reasoning that insurance was a business "affected
with the public interest." A contrary result was reached in Texas in
Queen Ins. Co. v. State2  on the grounds that insurance was not a
business affected with a public interest. The matter was more fully
considered in a Mississippi case ' which held state antitrust statutes
to apply to fire insurance companies despite the existence of legislation
creating the office of insurance commissioner and vesting him with
regulatory powers. Defendant companies had pleaded that the state
commissioner knew their rates were uniform and that they all employed
a rating bureau to arrive at their prices. They further alleged that
the commissioner had approved the uniform rates.2 °5 The defendants
admitted the insurance commissioner could initiate proceedings but,
on a theory of primary jurisdiction, denied that the plaintiff could do
so."° The court nevertheless sustained the action, finding no relation
between the insurance and antitrust laws.2
0
199. WPA, STATE ANTI-TRUST LAWS LV (Martin ed. 1940); see also Griffin v.
Palatine Ins. Co., 238 S.W. 637 (Tex. Comm'n of App. 1922).
200. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. State, 76 Ark. 303, 89 S.W. 42 (1905); Atlanta
Ass'n of Fire Ins. Agents v. McDonald, 181 Ga. 105, 181 S.E. 822 (1935); Beechley
v. Mulville, 102 Iowa 602, 70 N.W. 107, rehearing denied, 71 N.W. 428 (1897) ; State
v. Phipps, S0 Kan. 609, 31 Pac. 1097 (1893) ; Aetna Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 106 Ky.
864, 51 S.W. 624 (1899); Huston v. Reutlinger, 91 Ky. 333, 15 S.W. 867 (1891);
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Raymond, 70 Mich. 485, 38 N.W. 474 (1888); Miller v.
Fidelity Union Fire Ins. Co., 126 Miss. 301, 88 So. 711 (1921); American Fire Ins.
Co. v. State, 75 Miss. 24, 22 So. 99, 103 (1897); State ex rel. Crow v. Firemen's
Fund Ins. Co., 152 Mo. 1, 52 S.W. 595 (1899); State v. Surety Co., 91 Neb. 22, 135
N.W. 365 (1912); McCarter v. Firemen's Co., 74 N.J. Eq. 372, 73 Atl. 80 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1909) ; Harris v. Commonwealth, 113 Va. 746, 73 S.E. 561 (1912).
201. 126 Ill. App. 636 (1906).
202. Id. at 641.
203. 86 Tex. 250,24 S.W. 397 (1893).
204. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 126 Miss. 387, 88 So. 883 (1921).
205. Id. at 396, 88 So. at 887.
206. Id. at 400-01, 88 So. at 888.
207. Id. at 403-04, 88 So. at 889. Among the decisions looking in the same general
direction are Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 119 Kan. 452, 239 Pac. 974 (1925) ;
State ex rel. Barker v. Assurance Co., 251 Mo. 278, 158 S.W. 640 (1913) ; Potomac
Fire Ins. Co. v. State, 18 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929). Cf. Opinion of the
Justices, 271 Mass. 582, 171 N.E. 294 (1930) in which the court held it would be un-
constitutional to create a state auto insurance company to which all motorists would be
required to pay premiums, because it would constitute a monopoly and only regulated
public utilities should be permitted that sheltered status.
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The only case found squarely opposed is Board of Ins. Comm'rs v.
Sproles Motor Freight Linesf in which the Texas court considered
the validity of a statute permitting the Board of Insurance Commis-
sioners to fix insurance rates for motor carriers. It was argued that
the statute was in conflict with specific antitrust statutes dealing with
the insurance business. The court held that an insurer quoting rates
fixed by the state administration did not violate the state antitrust
statute thereby.20 9 The implication, of course, is that the existence of
regulation constitutes a pro tanto exemption from antitrust legislation.
Such was the state of the law prior to 1944. In that year the
Supreme Court in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Ass'n,210 overturned precedents almost a century old by holding that
insurance constituted "commerce" and hence was subject to regulation
by federal legislation. It followed that the antitrust laws could be
applied to various aspects of the business. The Court rejected the
argument that Congress could not have intended the antitrust laws to
apply to insurance because it must have been aware of the state
regulation already existing in 1890.211 It also brushed aside the
argument that holding insurance subject to the Sherman Act would
destroy state regulation:
"The argument that the Sherman Act did necessarily invalidate
many state laws regulating insurance we regard as exaggerated.
A few states go so far as to permit private insurance companies,
without state supervision, to agree upon and fix uniform insur-
ance rates. . . . No states authorize combinations of insurance
companies to coerce, intimidate, and boycott competitors and
consumers in the manner here alleged, and it cannot be that any
companies have acquired a vested right to engage in such destruc-
tive business practices." 212
Mr. Chief Justice Stone delivered a vigorous dissenting opinion in
which he said that the decision substituted for the varied and detailed
state regulation developed over a period of years the limited aim and
indefinite command of the Sherman Act for the suppression of re-
straints on competition in the marketing of goods and services affecting
interstate commerce, to be applied by the courts to the insurance business
as best they might.
2 1 3
208. 94 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
209. Id. at 773.
210. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
211. Id. at 559.
212. Id. at 562.
213. Id. at 581.
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The insurance companies met this catastrophe by seeking legis-
lative relief. They procured the passage of the McCarran Act of
March 9th, 1945,214 the essence of which was that after June 30th,
1948 the antitrust laws should be applicable to the business of in-
surance only to the extent that such business is not regulated by a
state law.215 The act was designed to assure that existing state power
to regulate insurance would continue, and accordingly contained a broad
declaration of congressional policy in favor of continued state regulation
of insurance in the public interest; congressional silence is not to be
construed to impose any barrier to continued state regulation.210 Im-
mediately thereafter, the states commenced enacting additional legisla-
tion to make sure that they would "regulate" the insurance companies
sufficiently to make the McCarran Act operative and thus relieve
insurers from the burdens of antitrust legislation. 17  The McCarran
statute itself did not indicate to what degree the states were required
to regulate and there has therefore been some variation in the response
of the state legislatures. All forty-eight states regulate rates; some
twenty-six states have enacted unfair trade practice acts specifically
applicable to the insurance business and about ten states have enacted
measures with respect to interlocking directorates, acquisition of stock
in competitive concerns and the like.21 8 Massachusetts has a statute
.which contains prohibitions of the type found in the federal *antitrust
statutes. In addition, it has a catch-all prohibition against unfair and
deceptive practices somewhat comparable to section five of the Federal
Trade Commission Act219 This legislation was held adequate to call
the McCarran Act into play and to exempt insurers from the operation
of the Sherman Act in Miley v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.2 20
On the other hand, the Federal Trade Commission in American
Hospital & Life Ins. Co. v. FTC, has taken the position that the
existence of state legislation merely makes state and federal jurisdiction
over the insurance companies concurrent in character."' Other litiga-
214. 59 STAT. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-14 (1952).
215. 59 STAT. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1952).
216. Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 319 (1955).
217. See Stelzer, The Insurance Industry and the Antitrust Laws, 1955 INs. L.
137; Donovan, State Regulation of Insurance, 1956 INs. L.J. 11; Donovan, Regulation
of Insurance Under the McCarran Act, 15 LAw & CoNTwm. PRoD. 473, 485-88 (1950).
218. Naujoks, Eight Years After S.E.A.U., 35 MAiQ. L. RFv. 339, 351, 354-55
(1952); Brook, Public Interest and the Commissioners-All Industry Laws, 15 LAwv
& CoNTsmp. PRoB. 606, 611 (1950).
219. 38 STAT. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1) (1952).
220. 148 F. Supp. 299, 302 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 242 F.2d 758 (1st Cir. 1957).
221. This position was reversed by the circuit court. 243 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1957),
cert. granted, 26 U.S.L. Wzim 3145 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1957) (No. 436).
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tion instituted by the Commission and private parties is pending in
various courts at the present time. That some aspects of the insurance
business are subject to antitrust scrutiny despite state regulation of a
general nature is demonstrated by recent decisions.2 2
BANKING
Financial institutions are supervised both by the federal and state
governments. It is not unusual for state statutes to provide separately
for the organization, capitalization and powers of banking corpora-
tions. 2 Perhaps the most significant feature of that legislation is
the power vested in a state officer to make regular examinations of
banks and to take action if he finds unsound conditions to exist. In
Illinois that officer is the Director of Financial Institutions, who is
directed to make periodic examinations. 24  If he finds the bank's
capital has been depleted or the business is being conducted in an
unsafe manner, he may take possession of the bank and operate it or
throw it into receivership.225 Lending limits are spelled out and the
withdrawal of capital is prohibited in circumstances which might im-
peril the safety of depositors.m
At the federal level jurisdiction over banks is vested in several
governmental departments. The Comptroller of the Currency has ex-
tensive powers under the National Bank Act. '27 Under the Federal
Reserve Act " the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
exercises sweeping powers over member banks, both state and federal.
Finally, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation enjoys jurisdiction
over banks whose deposits are insured by that agency. Under the
National Bank Act, the rate of interest which a bank may charge is
limited by a complex formula depending on local usury statutes, the
rediscount rate and other factors.' The Board of Governors may
also regulate the rate of interest to be paid by member banks to time
and savings depositors." Federal agencies also have extensive powers
with respect to such items as examinations and loan limits, and even
222. United States v. New Orleans Ins. Exchange, 148 F. Supp. 915 (E.D. La.
1957) ; United States v. Insurance Bd., 144 F. Supp. 684 (.D. Ohio 1956). See Note,
105 U. PA. L. Rlv. 977 (1957).
223. E.g., ILL. AxN. STAT. c. 16Y2, §§ 101-03 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1957).
224. Id. § 148.
225. Id. §§ 151-53.
226. Id. §§ 132-34, 141-42, 151-52.
227. 38 STAT. 261 (1913), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1952).
228. 38 STrAT. 251 (1913), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 221-23 (1952).
229. 48 STAT. 191 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1952).
230. 48 STAT. 182 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 371b (1952).
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have power to change bank management, which they have sometimes
exercised."' Indeed the chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation testified: "Banking is the most carefully and closely super-
vised and regulated industry in the United States." 12
Surprisingly few reported cases deal with the application to banks
of the antitrust laws and related common-law rules. In two cases
the courts talked as if banks were subject to antitrust principles but
held that the action would not lie on other grounds.' In Hall v. San
Jacinto Bank" 4 the Texas court said, but did not hold, that an agree-
ment between two banks to stifle competition with respect to payment
of interest on the deposit of county funds was against public policy
and void. Application of the Clayton Act to banking was discussed in
Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, wherein the corporation
argued that Congress had not in the past regulated the banking business
by general corporate legislation, but rather by special banking legisla-
tion, and that Congress had dealt specifically with banks under the
currency powers because of the doctrine that banking was not commerce.
Hence, the argument ran, Congress did not contemplate application to
banking in enacting the Clayton Act. The court, however, said that
since Congress intended to exercise all its powers under the commerce
clause banks were subject to the statute,2as but held that there was a
failure of proof. The federal Attorney General takes the position that
approval by the Comptroller of the Currency is no bar to an action
against a bank merger under the provisions of the Clayton Act.sa7  On
the other hand, he has admitted that:
231. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Study of Corporate Mergers, of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1956).
232. Id. at 90. Two provisions of the federal antitrust laws should be noted with
respect to banks. In the first place, § 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 731 (1914),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1952), probably inadvertently, is largely ineffective with
respect to mergers and consolidations of banks because by its terms it only prohibits such
mergers when accomplished through the purchase of stock. Since banks normally
are not permitted under banking statutes to purchase stock in any corporation, they
are unlikely to employ that method of merger and the language of the statute does
not reach other types of acquisitions. Note also that § 8 of the Clayton Act, id. § 19,
prohibiting directorships in competing corporations is to be enforced by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System and not by the Federal Trade Commission
insofar as banks are concerned. Indeed, the statute spells out special rules with respect
to common directorships among the banks.
233. United States v. Chicago Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, 123 F. Supp. 251 (N.D.
11. 1954) ; Peoples Bank v. Lamar County Bank, 107 Miss. 852, 66 So. 219 (1914),
reV'd on rehearing, 67 So. 961 (1915).
234. 255 S.W. 506 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
235. 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953).
236. Id. at 165-66.
237. 38 S' iA. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1952). See Gruis, Anti-
trust Laws and Their Application to Banking, 24 Go. WAsH. L. Rev. 89, 101 (1955).
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"Broad, general statutes, such as the antitrust laws, are not al-
ways easily reconcilable with highly specialized federal and state
banking laws and the policy which underlies them. . . . Ad-
mittedly a high degree of uniformity and cooperation between
banks is essential both for security and to provide the services
depositors require from their banks." 2s
It was also said that agreements among bankers with respect to the
handling of checks and the like are not likely to be objectionable under
the Sherman Act. 39
ALCOHOLIC BE VRAGES
As in the case of banking, control over intoxicants is divided
between the federal government and the states. Most states have
stringent measures controlling the traffic in such commodities.
2 40
The Illinois statute starts out by a sweeping prohibition against any
dealing in liquor except as permitted by the statute.24' A commission
is created to grant licenses, adopt regulations and the like.2 ' Licenses
are to be issued to manufacturers who may only make sales to dis-
tributors and importing distributors, the effect being to compel dis-
tribution of the goods through a middle man.24 Beer, however, may
be sold directly to retailers by brewers. 4 Neither a distiller nor other
manufacturer may be issued a license as a distributor or importing
distributor and the prohibition runs against officers, shareholders and
the like as well as the licensee itself.245 No manufacturer may be
issued a retailer's license. (with minor exceptions) and no retail licensee
may be engaged in the trade as a manufacturer or distributor.2 46
There follow prohibitions upon the extension of credit by manufacturers
or distributors to retailers designed to correct the evils of the "tied
house" of pre-prohibition days. Thus it is unlawful for the retailer
to accept or receive credit beyond the normal period (thirty days) and
238. Id. at 90, 93.
239. Id. at 94. Cf. Matter of Patterson, 18 Hun 221, 223 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1879),
aff'd per curiam, 78 N.Y. 608 (1879). Berle, Banking Under the Anti-Trust Laws, 49
CoLu m. L. RI-v. 589 (1949). At this writing there is pending in the Congress a bill
which would tighten the banking laws with respect to mergers but would leave au-
thority over such mergers in the banking supervisory agencies rather than in the
federal Attorney General or the Federal Trade Commission. AmgIcAN ENrzwlS-
Ass'N, ANALYSis ov FINANIcAL INsTiTu'ioNs AcT op 1957, at 6, 9-10 (1957).
240. E.g., ILL. ANN. STrAT. c 43, §§ 94-196 (Smith-Hurd 1944).
241. Id. § 96.
242. Id. § 108.
243. Id. § 115 (a).
244. Id. § 115 (d).
245. Id. § 121 (a).
246. Id. § 121 (e).
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it is unlawful for the manufacturer or distributor to give the retailer
anything of value, the statute setting out those prohibitions in great
detail.247  No manufacturer or distributor may furnish equipment to
a retailer, pay for his license, lend him money or have an interest in
his business.248 Furthermore, the manufacturer or distributor is not
to provide interior decorations, signs or other facilities except as limited
by detailed prescriptions in the statute. A sign, for example, may be
given to the retailer provided it does not cost more than $125.00.24'
Legislation in other states contains significantly different provisions,
but in the main is equally comprehensive.
Founded upon the twenty-first amendment, federal controls are
exercised under the Federal Alcohol Administration Act.2 50 That
statute likewise requires licensing of all activities in connection with
alcoholic beverages. One who is to engage in the importing, distilling
or brewing of liquors or the sale thereof in interstate commerce must
secure a federal permit." 1 The balance of the statute consists of
prohibitions bearing a resemblance to the antitrust laws. Thus it is
made unlawful to enter into an agreement whereby the retailer shall
purchase his requirements of liquors from one manufacturer or whole-
saler. z2 There follow detailed prohibitions with respect to inducements
which might have the effect of requirements contracts. Thus it is
unlawful for the manufacturer or wholesaler to acquire an interest in
the retailer's license or in his real or personal property used in the
business or to furnish equipment and the like. The manufacturer and
the wholesaler are also prohibited from paying the retailer for ad-
vertising services, guaranteeing his loafis, extending credit beyond usual
periods, or requiring the retailer to dispose of a quota of liquor.m It
is unlawful for the wholesaler or distiller to make sales upon consign-
ment.' Accurate labeling is required' and advertising must be
non-deceptive in character and specific in terms.'- Finally, interlocking
directorates among those engaged in the manufacture of alcoholic
beverages are forbidden absent approval of the Secretary of the
Treasury.2
7
247. Id. § 122.
248. Id.§ 123.
249. Ibid.
250. 49 STAT. 977 (1935), 27 U.S.C. §§ 201-03 (1952).
251. 49 STAr. 978 (1935), 27 U.S.C. § 203 (a) (2) (1952).
252. 49 STAT. 981 (1935), 27 U.S.C. § 205 (a) (1952).
253. 49 STAT. 981 (1935), 27 U.S.C. §§ 205 (b) (1)-(7) (1952).
254. 49 STAT. 981 (1935), 27 U.S.C. § 205 (d) (1952).
255. 49 STAT. 982 (1935), 27 U.S.C. §§ 205 (e) (1)-(15) (1952).
256. 49 STAT. 984 (1935), 27 U.S.C. §§ 205 (b) (1)-(5) (1952).
257. 49 STAT. 986 (1935), 27 U.S.C. § 208 (a) (1952).
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Prior to adoption of the eighteenth amendment, the business of
manufacturing and distributing alcoholic beverages was fully subject
to antitrust laws and the common-law rules against restraints of trade.
Thus in a Nebraska case " the court held a combination to monopolize
the distilling business invalid at common law in quo warranto pro-
ceedings.
Since adoption of the twenty-first amendment, there has been a
series of interesting cases with respect to the application of the antitrust
laws to the liquor trade. The first decision was Washington Brewers
Institute v. United States,"9 in which the brewers were indicted for
combining to fix prices. Defendants pleaded a state liquor statute
requiring the posting of prices by each brewer in specific zones and
forbidding changes in prices without a time interval of a period of days.
It was held that the Sherman Act was still applicable:
... [T]he broad theory of the Sherman Act that trade
should be free of artificial restraints is in many respects incom-
patible with the policy of state liquor-control legislation; and
wherever such conflicts exist the Sherman Act must give way, just
as the commerce clause itself gives way in identical circumstances.
• . . But we should be slow to assume that these states have
undertaken to sanction combinations among producers having as
their purpose the fixing of uniform and artificial beer prices ...
The state laws regulatory of the traffic in malt liquors are directed
toward individual conduct. Obedience to them is not rendered
difficult or impracticable by the enforcement of a federal statute
declaring price-fixing combinations unlawful. In arriving at prices
to be charged for their commodity brewers are not required by
the states to act otherwise than as free agents, nor are they
expected to confederate together with the design of suppressing
legitimate competition in respect of either quality or price." "26
The next case, United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc.,61 in-
volved an indictment against Colorado liquor dealers alleging a con-
spiracy to fix prices at "fair trade" levels. The indictment was sustained:
the Supreme Court said that the twenty-first amendment had not given
the states exclusive power to regulate the intrastate liquor business and
that no conflict was presented between the federal antitrust laws and
state liquor control legislation. 2
258. State v. Nebraska Distilling Co., 29 Neb. 700, 46 N.W. 155 (1890). Accord,
Dittman v. Distilling Co., 64 N.J. Eq. 537, 54 Atl. 570 (Ch. 1903) ; Brooklyn Distilling
Co. v. Standard Distilling and Distributing Co., 193 N.Y. 551, 86 N.E. 564 (1908);
Nestor v. Continental Brewing Co., 161 Pa. 473, 29 At. 102 (1894).
259. 137 F.2d 964 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 776 (1943).
260. Id. at 968.
261. 324 U.S. 293 (1945).
262. Id. at 299.
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The converse issue was then considered by the Maryland court in
Dundalk Liquor Co. v. Tawes.2  A Maryland statute directed ad-
ministrative officers to fix maximum discounts in the sale of liquor to
retailers and to require the filing of price schedules proposing changes.
The statute was held valid against an argument that it interfered with
federal power exercised under the commerce clause in the form of the
Sherman Act. In the opinion it was said:
"We assume, without deciding, that the requirements of
schedules of price changes and notice to competitors tend to restrict
competition and maintain prices and that such conduct by indi-
viduals, under no compulsion by law, would violate the Sherman
Act." 264
Maryland law was again considered in United States v. Maryland
State Licensed Beverage Ass'n,2 5 which dealt with the conflict between
the Sherman Act and a state statute permitting administrative officers
to regulate price changes by requiring notice of prices and prohibiting
discrimination. The state officers did not have power directly to fix
prices. A motion to dismiss the indictment was denied; the court said
that it would wait to see what it thought of the situation when the
evidence had been adduced :266
"The Maryland law and the Sherman Act come into direct
conflict at certain points. The Maryland statute requires that
schedules of price changes be filed and that notice thereof be given
to competitors. Such action apart from the State statute would
be forbidden by the Sherman Act. . . . If the indictment went
no further than this, it could not stand. But it does go further,
and charges conduct beyond anything reasonably within the ambit
of the State policy." 267
To date, therefore, the courts have not held the liquor trade exempt
from the antitrust laws by reason of the existence of state and federal
regulation. They have, however, indicated that there is at least a
potential conflict between the two types of statutes and that state statutes
of a price-fixing type would in some instances render antitrust legisla-
tion inapplicable.
268
263. 201 Md. 58, 92 A.2d 560 (1953).
264. Id. at 68, 92 A.2d at 564.
265. 138 F. Supp. 685 (D. Md. 1956).
266. Id. at 703.
267. Id. at 701. Cf. United States v. United Liquors Corp., 352 U.S. 991 (1956).
268. See United States v. Maryland State Licensed Beverage Ass'n, 138 F. Supp-
685, 699 (D. Md. 1956).
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OTHER INDUSTRIES
Agriculture, once the freest of all occupations, is now heavily
regulated 69 Certain agricultural activities are provided broad exemp-
tions from the antitrust laws. Producers' cooperatives, for example,
are afforded exemptions 270 under section 6 of the Clayton Act,2"'
section 5 of the Cooperative Marketing Ac272 and sections 1 and 2
of the Capper-Volstead Act.2 73 The tendency of the courts has been
to construe specific exemptions strictly and not to find others by
implication." 4
Express companies,27  investment bankers,2" 6  operators of
bridges2 7" and pipelines,278 and sleeping car proprietors 279 have all
been subjected to extensive regulation, too. An early case held express
companies subject to the common-law rules against restraints of
trade2 8 When an agreement has been expressly approved by the
ICC, however, the courts will refuse to make it the basis of an action
under the antitrust laws.28 ' Likewise, in view of federal regulation, one
court has said that the Sherman Act is not fully applicable to the flota-
tion of investment securities.28 2  The opinion, however, went off on
the grounds that the syndicate conduct involved did not amount to a
conspiracy, but constituted a joint venture for a temporary purpose.
Controversy with regard to the exclusive character of franchises
to erect and operate bridges goes back to the famous decision in
269. See, e.g.,. the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 52 STAT. 31, 7 U.S.C.§§ 1281-83 (1952); Packers & Stockyards Act, 42 STAT. 159 (1921), 7 U.S.C. §3
181-83 (1952); Sugar Act of 1948, 61 STAT. 922, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1100-01 (1952).
270. See Recent Case, 105 U. PA. L. Rxv. 996 (1957).
271. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1952).
272. 44 STAT. 802 (1926), 7 U.S.C. §§ 451-57 (1952).
273. 42 STAT. 388 (1922), 7 U.S.C. §§ 291, 292 (1952).
274. See, e.g., United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939); Producers' Live-
stock Marketing Ass'n v. United States, 241 F.2d 192 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. granted,
23 U.S.L. Wimx 3019 (U.S. July 23, 1957) (No. 118) ; Morrison v. Bandt, 145 Kan.
942, 67 P.2d 584 (1937). But see United States v. Maryland Cooperative Milk Pro-
ducers, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 151 (D.D.C. 1956); United States v. Dairy Cooperative
Ass'n, 49 F. Supp. 475 (D. Ore. 1943); United States v. Swift & Co., 46 F. Supp.
848, 850 (D. Colo. 1942), remanded on other grounds, 318 U.S. 442 (1943); Dairy-
men's League v. Weckerle, 160 Misc. 866, 291 N.Y. Supp. 704, 715 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
275. See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Act, 24 STAT. 379 (1887), as amended, 49
U.S.C. § 1 (1952); I.m. ANN. STAT. c. 111 2/3, §§ 1-3 (Smith-Hurd 1954).
276. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 48 STAT. 74, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1952); Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 881, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1952); ILL. ANN. STAT.
c. 121 ', § 137 (Smith-Hurd 1954).
277. See General Bridge Act of 1946, 60 STAT. 847, 33 U.S.C. §§ 525-27 (1952).
278. See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Act § 1, 24 STAT. 379 (1887), as amended, 49
U.S.C. § 1 (1952); ILL. ANN. STAT c. 111 2/3, §§ 1-3 (Smith-Hurd 1954); Pipe Line
Cases, 234 U.S. 548 (1914).
279. See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Act § 1, 24 STAT. 379 (1887), as amended, 49
U.S.C. § 1 (1952); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 111 2/3, §§ 1-3 (Smith-Hurd 1954).
280. Sandford v. Railroad Co., 24 Pa. 378, 382 (1855). But cf Express Cases,
117 U.S. 1, 24 (1886).
281. United States v. Railway Express Agency, 101 F. Supp. 1008, 1012 (D. Del.
1951).
282. United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 691-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
UTILITIES AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS
Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren
Bridge.2 3 It does not appear, however, that litigation has developed
with respect to the application of the antitrust laws to bridge companies.
Courts have held operators of pipelines fully subject to both
common-law rules against restraints of trade and to antitrust statutes.
28 4
And the same result has been reached in the case of sleeping car
proprietors. In the only recent case carefully considering the matter,
the court held that ICC regulation of the Pullman Company was
restricted to the company's relations with the traveling public and
did not control the supply of sleeping car service to the railways.2"
CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing survey makes it abundantly plain that the law is
in a state of chaos. Some regulated industries are subject to antitrust
legislation; others are not. Some courts hold business subject to inter-
ventionist enactments to be free from rules prohibiting restraints of
trade; others do not. New cases are decided without reference to old
precedents and the courts in general have been unable to explain
coherently the conclusions they have reached.
No doubt, elementary analysis would clarify the picture. We
could, for example, separate the decisions on a basis of jurisdiction
so that all the cases decided in one state were grouped together. Per-
haps such a breakdown would reveal greater consistency of judicial
thinking. In addition, a good many decisions have been compelled by
specific statutory language, recognition of which would somewhat
clarify the law. Note also the possibility that some states may apply
antitrust principles only to necessities and not luxuries,2 86 with oblique
results for regulated industries. Finally, and most importantly, a
chronological arrangement of the authorities would no doubt be illu-
minating. At one time the antitrust laws were relied upon to protect
the public from all types of monopolies. As the years went by and
regulatory commissions were created to control specific industries,
283. 36 U.S. (11 Peters) *420 (1837). It continues to the present day. See, e.g.,
Talbot v. Louisiana Highway Comm'n, 159 La. 910 106 So. 377 (1925). Cf. Nicomen
Boom Co. v. North Shore Boom Co., 40 Wash. 315, 82 Pac. 412 (1905).
284. See, e.g., McClellan v. Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 95 F. Supp. 977 (D. Minn.
1951) ; Calor Oil Co. v. Franzell, 128 Ky. 715, 109 S.W. 328 (1908) ; West Virginia
Transp. Co. v. Ohio River Pipe Line Co., 22 W. Va. 600 (1883). Cf. Panhandle
Eastern Pipeline Co. v. FPC, 169 F.2d 881, 883-84 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S.
854 (1948).
285. United States v. Pullman Co., 50 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1943). Cf. Keith
Ry. Equipment Co. v. Ass'n of American Railroads, 64 F. Supp. 917 (N.D. Ill. 1946).
But cf. Chicago, St Louis & New Orleans R.R. v. Pullman So. Car Co., 139
U.S. 79, 89 (1891).
286. E.g., HAi & HAMu, MAmr Powm § 3.11 (1958).
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there has been a tendency to let antitrust principles play a subordinated
role in many situations."8 7
It does not appear likely, however, that the foregoing procedures
would alone reduce chaos to coherence. Take, for example, Georgia
v. Pennsylvania R.R.,288 decided after the Interstate Commerce Act, as
frequently amended, had been in effect for decades. The Interstate
Commerce Commission was invested with sweeping powers over the
railroads. The Court was not troubled by specific constitutional or
statutory provisions. Yet four of the Justices could not agree with five
of their brethren as to whether the Sherman Act should be applied to
a railroad enterprise. By the vote of a single Justice, the carriers were
held subject to antitrust legislation in addition to the interventionist
statutes administered by the Commerce Commission.289
A thorough effort to resolve the conflict requires action in several
stages. First, the antitrust statutes in question should be analyzed in
detail to determine their objectives: the Sherman Act is generally
considered an instrument designed to promote competition. The Clay-
ton Act, however, goes at least part of the way toward the regulation
of monopoly. Note, for example, that many regulatory commissions
are specifically directed by their organic statutes to eliminate price
discrimination and that a section of the Clayton Act2. is directed to
the same end. Under the provisions291 of the Clayton Act the regula-
tory commissions enforce portions 2 thereof against the various
industries under their jurisdiction. We cannot therefore take the
Sherman Act as the beginning and end of antitrust legislation; we
must take account of the fact that modem antitrust principles go a
considerable direction toward "soft" competition.
A second step would involve detailed analysis of the regulatory
statutes and administrative action thereunder. Some legislation is not
interventionist in character; it merely seeks to promote the public health
and safety. Plumbers, for example, may be licensed; ostensibly, at least,
the purpose is to protect public health and not to protect plumbers from
competition. As we have seen, many of the interventionist statutes
287. TRoxm, EcoNoMIcS oP PUiLC UTILITIS 190 (1947); Hadley, Public Utili-
ties and the Anti-Trust Law, 10 B.U.L. Rtv. 351, 358 (1930); Lake, Competition in
the Public Utility Fields, 10 Miss. L.J. 197, 201-03 (1938) ; Note, 64 HAv. L. Rev.
1154, 1156 (1951). Cf. REPORT oP THE ATToaNE GNESRAL's NATIONAL Co ITTrrEE
To STUDY TH ANTITRUST LAws 270 (1955).
288. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
289. Some observers might deem such a result so burdensome to investors as to
amount to a denial of substantive due process of law.
290. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1952).
291. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1952).
292. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 14, 18, 19 (1952).
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discussed above vary in content. In the broadcasting field entry is
rigidly controlled but prices are not fixed. In other areas both prices
and entry are controlled while the management of the regulated
enterprise remains free to choose methods of production and the like.
What is needed is an examination of the degree of monopoly fostered
by interventionist controls. In such a study we should have to take
account of the competition (particularly inter-industry competition)
which remains; putting the question another way, we should have to
determine the amount of discretion remaining in management. If the
directors of a corporation are so shackled by statutes and administrative
action that they have little discretion remaining, it would be odd to
require them to enter into competition. For the essence of competition
is freedom to make one's own decisions and to move ahead (or back-
ward) at one's own speed.2
At the conclusion of such analysis, it should be possible to group
interventionist regulation into a number of categories. As suggested
above, some commissions fix maximum prices, others fix minimum
prices and still others fix all prices; some license entrance into the field
and others do not. A few of the statutes appear to empower adminis-
trative agencies to enforce policies closely akin to those enunciated in
the supplementary antitrust legislation and particularly the Clayton Act.
Finally, a comparison of the multiple antitrust objectives with
the specific types of regulation established by analysis would prove
suggestive. For each category we could determine roughly the degree
of discretion left in business management. We should also have some
idea as to whether competition had been eliminated or remained in
some sublimated or even active form. It might then be possible to
establish criteria for the evaluation of any particular type of public
utility control. Examination of the regulatory system in the light of
such criteria would then suggest whether specific antitrust principles
should be applied to the industry in question.
293. In view of the broad discretion vested in the administrative agencies, any
such study would inevitably involve a survey of the actual operation of the regula-
tory mechanism.
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